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Abstract
We present an arbitrage free theoretical framework for modeling bid and ask prices of dividend
paying securities in a discrete time setup using theory of dynamic acceptability indices. In
the first part of the paper we develop the theory of dynamic subscale invariant performance
measures, on a general probability space, and discrete time setup. We prove a representation
theorem of such measures in terms of a family of dynamic convex risk measures, and provide a
representation of dynamic risk measures in terms of g-expectations, and solutions of BS∆Es with
convex drivers. We study the existence and uniqueness of the solutions, and derive a comparison
theorem for corresponding BS∆Es. In the second part of the paper we discuss a market model
for dividend paying securities by introducing the pricing operators that are defined in terms
of dynamic acceptability indices, and find various properties of these operators. Using these
pricing operators, we define the bid and ask prices for the underlying securities and then for
derivatives in this market. We show that the obtained market model is arbitrage free, and we
also prove a series of properties of these prices.
Keywords: dynamic acceptability index, dynamic conic finance, dynamic convex risk measures,
g-expectation, transaction costs, dividend paying securities, dynamic bid and ask, arbitrage free
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1 Introduction
The main goal of this paper is to contribute to the arbitrage free theoretical framework for modeling
bid and ask prices of dividend paying securities in a discrete time setup, that was originated in
Bielecki et al. [BCIR13]. As in [BCIR13] we follow the conic finance methodology, initiated by
Cherny and Madan [MC10]. The idea behind (dynamic) conic finance is to use (dynamic) coherent
acceptability indices to define bid/ask prices in the spirit of no-good-deal method proposed by
Cochrane and Saa-Requejo [CSR00]. We recall that a coherent acceptability index [CM09] is a
function α defined on the set of bounded random variables L∞ with values in [0,+∞], that is
monotone increasing, scale-invariant, quasi-concave and additionally satisfies a continuity (Fatou)
property. The elements of L∞ can be viewed as terminal values of given portfolios or payoffs, and
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in this case the coherent acceptability index is a measure of performance of these portfolios, and
essentially it is a generalization of the well known measures of performance such as Sharpe Ratio
or Gain-to-Loss Ratio. We refer the reader to the original paper [CM09] for a detailed discussion
of economical and financial aspects of these measures, their robust representation and various
examples. In [BCZ14, BBN14] the authors study the dynamic version of coherent acceptability
indices. Similar to static case, it was shown that any dynamic coherent acceptability index αt can
be uniquely characterized by an increasing family of dynamic coherent risk measures1 {ρxt }x∈R.
In the (static) conic finance framework, the time zero ask price pask of a future payoff X is
defined as follows:
pask = inf{a ∈ R | α(a−X∗) ≥ γ}, (1.1)
where γ is a fixed pre-specified level of acceptability, and X∗ is the discounted value of X. That
is, the ask price is the smallest amount of cash paid today, such that the combined cashflow
a −X∗ is acceptable at least at level γ. Moreover, it can be shown that the ask price admits the
representation pask = ργ(−X∗), which is useful for computational purposes. The bid price pbid
is defined similarly. Additionally, one can easily incorporate in this definition the possibility to
hedge part of the risk by trading in an underlying market. Also in [MC10], it was shown that the
conic finance pricing framework does not admit arbitrage, and can be used as a tool to shrink the
arbitrage–free price interval. The extension of conic finance to multiperiod markets is quite delicate,
especially if the underlying securities pay dividends and bear transaction costs themselves. The
main challenges are due to the fact that the wealth process associated with a self-financing trading
strategy is not a linear functional of trading strategies. The dynamic conic finance theory was
first studied in [BCIR13]. This was done for the case of discrete time and finite probability space.
There, the authors also investigated the connection between dynamic conic finance framework and
classical arbitrage theory, based on the arbitrage theory for the corresponding markets developed
in [BCR12].
Although the dynamic conic finance theory is a flexible nonlinear pricing framework it does not
fully capture the liquidity risk. More precisely, due to scale invariance of the dynamic coherent
acceptability indices, the bid/ask prices are homogeneous in the number of shares traded. However,
the typical market phenomenon is that the more shares one buys the higher price per share one
pays; similarly, more share one sells, lower price per share is received. It turns out, as first observed
in [RGS13], that replacing the scale invariance postulate by sub-scale invariance yields a pricing
framework that captures the liquidity charge describe above (see also [BN09]). Accordingly, these
authors develop a ‘dynamic conic finance’ framework generated by sub-scale invariant acceptability
indices. They consider a continuous time setup for pricing terminal payoffs defined on a general
probability space. Similar to original conic finance case [MC10], the authors derive a representation
theorem for bid/ask prices in terms of convex risk measures, and consequently in terms of solutions
of some Backward Stochastic Differential Equations (BSDEs) and g-expectations.
This paper builds upon the ideas described above, and provides a fairly general theoretical
pricing framework that can be applied to a large class of financial markets. The paper is divided
into two major parts, and the main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
• In the first part we develop the theory of dynamic subscale invariant performance measures,
1We recall that a coherent risk measure is a function ρ : L∞ → R, that is monotone decreasing, subaditive,
homogenous and cash-additive [ADEH99]. For dynamic version of coherent risk measures see for instance [Rie04,
ADE+07, BCZ14].
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on a general probability space, and is the discrete time setup. We prove a representation
theorem of such measures in terms of a family of dynamic convex risk measures. Moreover,
we also provide a representation of dynamic risk measures in terms of g-expectations, and
solutions of BS∆Es with convex drivers. We investigate the existence and uniqueness of the
solutions, and provide a comparison theorem for corresponding BS∆Es.
• The second part discusses a market model for dividend paying securities. We introduce the
pricing operators that are defined in terms of dynamic acceptability indices, and find various
properties of these operators. Using these pricing operators, we define the bid and ask prices
for the underlying securities and then for derivatives in this market. We show that the
obtained market model is arbitrage free, and we also prove a series of important, and desired,
properties of these prices.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to Backward Stochastic Difference
Equations (BS∆Es). Although the theory of Backward Stochastic Differential Equations is a mature
field (cf. [MY99]), there are only few papers [Sta09, CE11b, CE11a, CS13] devoted to their discrete
counterpart. Even though the existing results on BS∆Es are quite general, they do not meet
our specific needs, which prompted us to establish existence and uniqueness of the solutions for a
(large) class of BS∆Es relevant to our needs. As in the existing literature, we define the non-linear
expectation, or g-expectation, in terms of the solution of a BS∆E, and we prove a series of standard
properties of g-expectations. The results obtained in this section are new, although general ideas
of the proofs are similar to those in [Sta09, CE11b, CS13].
In Section 3 we define and study the notion of Dynamic Acceptability Index (DAI), which,
essentially, is a Dynamic Coherent Acceptability Index [BCZ14] with scale invariance property
replaced with sub-scale invariance. It turns out that in this case a DAI can be generated by a
family of dynamic convex risk measures, that are introduced and studied in this section. Special
attention is paid to time consistency of these risk and performance measures, which is conveniently
used in the sequel. Similar to [RG06, RGS13] we show that a dynamic convex risk measure can
be characterized by a solution of BS∆E with convex driver or, equivalently, by the corresponding
g-expectation.
Even though the results from Section 2 and Section 3 serve as background for next two sections,
they are also of independent interest, and they can be applied to other areas, such as stochastic
processes and mathematical finance. For example, the risk and performance measure can be used
in risk management, and the established results are natural continuation of the axiomatic theory
of risk and performance measures.
Section 4 is devoted to dynamic conic finance. In Section 4.1, we start by defining a market
model consisting of a banking account and K securities (or assets). We assume that these K assets
may pay dividends, and that the amount of dividend paid can be different depending on whether
one holds a long or a short position. The banking account is the only asset that trades with no
transaction costs. The prices of the securities are given by bid and ask pricing operators. The
pricing operators are not necessarily homogeneous (of degree one) in the number of shares traded.
We present two examples of such assets – a commonly traded stock and a Credit Default Swap
(CDS), and we describe in detail the corresponding dividend streams and pricing operators. We
introduce the relevant financial definitions in this market model, such as value process, self-financing
trading strategy, and arbitrage. The main challenge comes from the fact the value process is not
a linear functional with respect to trading strategies, and as a consequence, one needs to define
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appropriately the notion of self-financing trading strategy and that of arbitrage, by taking into
account the set-up value and liquidation value associated with trading strategy (see Section 4.2).
Next, in Section 4.3, we define some of the main objects of this paper – the acceptability bid and
ask prices – by using the dynamic acceptability indices. The general idea is similar to (1.1). We
fix a dynamic acceptability index α and an acceptability level γ and we define the acceptability
ask/bid price as the minimum/maximum amount added to the dividend stream today that makes
the combined cash-flow acceptable at level γ. Applying the results from Sections 2 and 3, we provide
a representation of acceptability bid and ask prices in terms of nonlinear expectations associated
with the corresponding family of convex drivers. Also here, we prove a series of fundamental
properties of these prices, such as that bid is always smaller than ask, convexity or concavity
in number of shares traded, appropriate form of time consistency, etc. In Section 4.4, using the
acceptability bid and ask prices, we build a market model that satisfies all the necessary properties
postulated in Section 4.1, and we show that this market model is arbitrage free, in the sense of
Section 4.2. We prove that bid price of a given dividend stream is always smaller than the ask
price, even if one uses different dynamic acceptability indices or/and acceptability levels for bid
and ask. In Section 5 we discuss the valuation of derivatives within this pricing framework. We
start with definitions of super-hedging cash-flows, and of dynamic acceptability bid and ask prices
of derivatives, by taking into account the possibility to hedge using the underlying securities. In
spirit of [BCIR13] we introduce the notion of no good deal and prove that if there are no good deals,
then the acceptability prices in the extended market are arbitrage free prices. Similar to Section 4,
we provide a series of results about the proposed pricing framework. In particular we give sufficient
conditions under which the bid price is equal to ask price and the trades will take place given
that both parties are using conic finance pricing methodology. It should be mentioned that time
consistency of dynamic acceptability indices plays a central role in developing the dynamic conic
finance proposed here.
For convenience, a number of technical results are deferred to the Appendix.
Finally, we want to mention that we provide illustrative examples of the results obtained in the
paper throughout, starting with concrete examples of drivers for BS∆Es, that give examples of risk
measures and acceptability indices. We also discuss several examples of market models. Due to
already lengthy manuscript, the numerical implementation of the results from this paper, as well
as application of them to real market data, will be investigated in a sequel.
2 Backward Stochastic Difference Equations
Let T be a fixed and finite time horizon, and let T := {0, 1, . . . , T}. We consider a filtered
probability space (Ω,F , {Ft}
T
t=0,P), with F0 = {∅,Ω} and F = FT . Throughout, we will use the
notations Lp(Ft) := L
2(Ω,Ft,P), p ≥ 1, t ∈ T . Also, we will denote by X the set of all adapted
and square integrable stochastic processes on (Ω,F , {Ft}
T
t=0,P). We reserve the notation ∆ for
the backward difference operator ∆Xt := Xt −Xt−1, t ∈ T , where X is a stochastic process, and
we also take the convention ∆X0 := X0. In what follows, all equalities and inequalities will be
understood in P-almost surely sense. We recall that the predictable quadratic variation 〈X〉t of a
stochastic process X is defined as a predictable process, starting at zero, and such that X2t − 〈X〉t
is a martingale with respect to filtration {Ft}. It can be shown that ∆〈X〉t = E[(∆Xt)
2|Ft−1].
In the sequel, the function g : T × Ω × R → R will play the role of a driver for considered
Backward Stochastic Difference Equations (BS∆Es), and we will assume that it satisfies
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Assumption A:
A1. the mapping (t, ω) 7→ g(t, ω, z) is predictable for any z ∈ R;
A2. the function z 7→ g(t, ω, z) is uniformly Lipschitz continuous, i.e. there exists ct(ω) ∈ L
∞(Ft−1),
such that for any z1, z2 ∈ R, t ∈ T ,
|g(t, ω, z1)− g(t, ω, z2)| ≤ ct(ω)|z1 − z2|;
A3. g(t, ω, 0) = 0 for any t ∈ T .
Throughout the paper we will denote by c the Lipschitz constant of function g, that is
ct(ω) = ess inf
{
lt(ω) ∈ L
∞(Ft−1) : |g(t, ω, z1)− g(t, ω, z2)| ≤ lt(ω)|z1 − z2|, ω ∈ Ω, z1, z2 ∈ R
}
,
for any t ∈ T . Also, we will suppress the explicit dependence on ω, if no confusion arise; for
example, we may write g(t, z) instead of g(t, ω, z).
We consider the following Backward Stochastic Difference Equation (BS∆E),
Yt = YT +
∑
t<s≤T
g(s, Zs)∆〈W 〉s −
∑
t<s≤T
Zs∆Ws +MT −Mt, t ∈ T , (2.1)
with terminal condition YT ∈ L
2(FT ), and whereWt is a fixed square integrable martingale process
with independent increments, and such that ∆〈W 〉t 6= 0 for any t ∈ T . As already mentioned, the
function g is usually referred to as the driver of the BS∆E (2.1).
As one may expect, due to its ‘backward’ nature, and similar to continuous time BSDEs, a
solution is a triple of processes, rather than just an adapted process. Next, we give the precise
definition of a solution of BS∆E (2.1).
Definition 2.1. A solution to BS∆E (2.1) is a triple of processes (Y,Z,M) such that: (Yt, Zt,Mt) ∈
L2(Ft)× L
2(Ft−1)× L
2(Ft), it satisfies equality (2.1) for all t ∈ T , and M is a martingale process
strongly orthogonal2 to W .
In general, for fixed Z and M , Y that satisfies (2.1) is not necessarily an adapted process. For
example, by taking the terminal condition X ∈ FT , and putting Zt = Mt = 0 for all t ∈ T , then
Yt = X for any t ∈ T . In this case, Y is not an adapted process unless Ft = FT , t ∈ T . However,
we will show that due to Galtchouk-Kunita-Watanabe decomposition (cf. [FS04, Theorem 10.18]),
there exists Z and M along with Y such that they (Y,Z,M) is a solution of (2.1). We recall that
W is said to have the predictable representation property, if F = FW implies that for any square
integrable martingale process X, there exists a predictable process Z, such that ∆Xt = Zt∆Wt. It
can be shown that if F = FW and W has predictable representation property, then Mt = 0 for all
t ∈ T . If W does not satisfy the predictable representation property, then a martingale process M
which is orthogonal to W is indeed needed to ensure that the solution of (2.1) is well defined.
With slide abuse of notations, sometimes will refer to process Y as solution of BS∆E (2.1),
rather than saying process Y from the solution (Y,Z,M).
2We say that the process M is strongly orthogonal to W if the process WtMt is a martingale.
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Without going into technical details, we want to mention that (2.1) essentially corresponds to
a discrete version of a Backward Stochastic Differential Equation (BSDE) of the form
− dYt = g(t, Yt, Zt)dt− ZtdBt, YT = ξ, t ≥ 0, (2.2)
where ξ is a square integrable terminal condition, g is a progressively measurable function (also
called the driver), and B is Brownian motion. Existence, uniqueness, as well as numerous prop-
erties, of the solution of such BSDEs are well studied and understood (cf. [PP90, Pen97, EKQ97,
BCH+00]). If, it is assumed that W from (2.1) is a symmetric random walk such that P(∆Wt =
±1) = 12 , then the solution of (2.1) will converge weakly to the solution of (2.2) as ∆t→ 0. Rather
than taking BS∆Es as an approximations of BSDEs, we will study the properties of BS∆Es in
their own right, and use them as fundamental tools to study dynamic risk measures and dynamic
acceptability indices. As mentioned above, the theory for discrete-time counterpart of (2.2) is still a
developing field, and one goal of this paper is to establish some fundamental properties of solutions
of these type of equations tailored to our needs. Similar work on BS∆Es has been done in [CE11a],
[CE11b], [CS13], and [Sta09], but unlike them, the driver g considered in our paper does not depend
on Yt. One reason to consider these type of drivers comes from the fact that the cash-additivity
and convexity properties of dynamic risk measures generated by the solution of (2.1) imply that
the driver g does not dependent on Y , and hence we focus only on drivers of the form g(t, z) in the
first place.
2.1 Existence and Uniqueness of Solutions
In this section we will present a general result on existence and uniqueness of the solution of BS∆E
(2.1).
Theorem 2.2. Assume that the driver g satisfies Assumption A, and that the terminal condition
YT ∈ L
2(FT ). Then, there exists a unique solution of equation (2.1).
Proof. First, we will prove the existence using backward induction argument. Given YT ∈ L
2(FT ),
we consider the equation
YT−1 = YT + g(T,ZT )∆〈W 〉T − ZT∆WT +∆MT , (2.3)
where ZT ,∆MT and YT−1 are the unknowns. Since YT ∈ L
2(FT ), then
E[E[YT |FT−1]
2] ≤ E[E[(YT )
2|FT−1]] = E[(YT )
2] <∞.
Hence, YT − E[YT |FT−1] is a square integrable martingale difference, so it admits the Galtchouk-
Kunita-Watanabe decomposition, which implies that there exist ZT ∈ FT−1, ZT∆WT ∈ L
2(FT ),
∆MT ∈ L
2(FT ) such that E[∆MT |FT−1] = 0, E[∆MT∆WT |FT−1] = 0 and
YT − E[YT |FT−1] = ZT∆WT −∆MT . (2.4)
We multiply both sides of last identity by ∆WT , and then apply E[ · |FT−1] to both sides. This
implies that E[YT∆WT |FT−1] = ZT∆〈W 〉T . Therefore,
ZT =
E[YT∆WT |FT−1]
∆〈W 〉T
. (2.5)
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Since W has independent increments, then ∆〈W 〉T = E[∆W
2
T |FT−1] = E[∆W
2
T ] =: C, and by our
initial assumption C 6= 0. Hence, we deduce
E[Z2T ] =
E[E[YT∆WT |FT−1]
2]
C2
≤
E[CE[Y 2T |FT−1]]
C2
=
E[Y 2T ]
C
<∞.
With ZT and ∆MT known, taking into account (2.4) and (2.3), we conclude that YT−1 must be
given by
YT−1 = E[YT |FT−1] + g(T,ZT )∆〈W 〉T . (2.6)
From here, due to A1 and Proposition A.3, we get that YT−1 ∈ FT−1. Also, using A2, A3 and the
fact that ZT ∈ L
2(FT−1), we have
E[(g(T,ZT )∆〈W 〉T )
2] = E[g(T,ZT )
2E[∆〈W 〉2T |FT−1]] ≤ C
2‖cT ‖
2
∞E[Z
2
T ] <∞
and thus YT−1 ∈ L
2(FT−1). Therefore, we determined YT−1, ZT and ∆MT .
We continue this backward procedure for any finite number of steps smaller than T : having
Yt+1 ∈ L
2(Ft+1) for some fixed t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1}, by similar arguments as above, we find
(Yt, Zt+1,∆Mt+1) ∈ L
2(Ft)× L
2(Ft)× L
2(Ft+1), such that
Yt = Yt+1 + g(t+ 1, Zt+1)∆〈W 〉t+1 − Zt+1∆Wt+1 +∆Mt+1, t = 0, . . . , T − 1, (2.7)
with
Yt+1 − E[Yt+1|Ft] = Zt+1∆Wt+1 −∆Mt+1, (2.8)
Zt+1 =
E[Yt+1∆Wt+1|Ft]
∆〈W 〉t+1
, (2.9)
Yt = E[Yt+1|Ft] + g(t+ 1, Zt+1)∆〈W 〉t+1. (2.10)
By taking the convention Z0 = 0,M0 = 0, and letting Mt :=M0 +
∑t
s=1∆Ms, we have that (2.1)
holds true for all t ∈ T . Moreover, M is a square integrable martingale process. Finally, since
E[MtWt|Ft−1] = E[(
t∑
s=1
∆Ms)Wt|Ft−1]
=
t−1∑
s=1
∆MsE[Wt|Ft−1] + E[∆Mt(Wt−1 +∆Wt)|Ft−1]
=Mt−1Wt−1, t = 1, . . . , T,
we conclude that M is strongly orthogonal to W , which concludes the proof of existence of the
solution.
Next, we will prove the uniqueness. Assume there are two solutions (Y 1t , Z
1
t ,M
1
t ) and (Y
2
t , Z
2
t ,M
2
t ),
t ∈ T , of BS∆E (2.1) with terminal condition YT . Then
Y 1T−1 − Y
2
T−1 = (g(T,Z
1
T )− g(T,Z
2
T ))∆〈W 〉T − (Z
1
T − Z
2
T ) + ∆M
1
T −∆M
2
T . (2.11)
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From (2.9), we have that Z1T =
E[YT∆WT |FT−1]
∆〈W 〉T
= Z2T . Hence, by (2.8), we get
∆M1T = −YT + E[YT |FT−1] + Z
1
T∆WT = −YT + E[YT |FT−1] + Z
2
T∆WT = ∆M
2
T .
From here, in view of (2.11), we immediately conclude that Y 1T−1 = Y
2
T−1. Inductively, and by
using the convention that Z10 = Z
2
0 = 0, M
1
0 = M
2
0 = 0, we get that (Y
1
t , Z
1
t ,M
1
t ) = (Y
2
t , Z
2
t ,M
2
t ),
for any t ∈ T . Therefore, the solution is unique, and this concludes the proof.
Remark 2.3. Throughout, we will make intensive use of the recurrent expressions (2.7), (2.8), (2.9)
and (2.10) that actually determine (or define) the unique solution of BS∆E.
Remark 2.4. Note that, if F = FW and if W has the predictable representation property, then, in
view of (2.8), we have that ∆Mt = 0, and since M0 = 0, we conclude that Mt = 0, t ∈ T , in (2.1).
Saying differently, if F = FW and W has the predictable representation property then there exists
a pair of processes (Yt, Zt), t ∈ T , that is the unique solution of equation
Yt = YT +
∑
t<s≤T
g(s, Zs)∆〈W 〉s −
∑
t<s≤T
Zs∆Ws, t ∈ T .
One important example of martingale W that has the predictable representation property is
the symmetric random walk (see Proposition A.1).
2.2 Comparison Results
We will prove a series of comparison type results about the solutions of BS∆Es. These results,
besides being of fundamental importance for the theory of BS∆Es itself, will also serve as key
ingredients for describing the risk measures developed later on in the paper. More precisely, the
version of the comparison theorem provided here is tailored to our needs and it will be used to
prove the monotonicity property of proposed risk measures.
We start with an auxiliary result.
Lemma 2.5. Consider BS∆E (2.1), and assume that the driver g satisfies Assumption A, and that
the terminal condition YT ≥ 0. Also, suppose that for a fixed t ∈ T , g(s, z) = xsz, s ∈ {t, . . . , T},
where x is such that 1 + xs∆Ws > 0, for any s ∈ {t, . . . , T}. Then, Ys ≥ 0 for all s ∈ {t, . . . , T}.
Moreover, if Yt = 0 on A ∈ Ft, then Ys = 0 on A, for all s ∈ {t, . . . , T}.
Proof. First note that Assumption A and Theorem 2.2 guarantee that the solution (Y,Z,M) of
(2.1) exists. Fix t ∈ T , assume that g(s, z) = xsz, s ∈ {t, . . . , T} and 1+xs∆Ws > 0, s ∈ {t, . . . , T}.
Then, by (2.10) and (2.9),
Ys−1 = E[Ys|Fs−1] + xsZs∆〈W 〉s
= E[Ys|Fs−1] + xs
E[Ys∆Ws|Fs−1]
∆〈W 〉s
∆〈W 〉s
= E[Ys|Fs−1] + xsE[Ys∆Ws|Fs−1].
Recall that g is predictable, and since g(s, z) = xsz, we have that xs is Fs−1-measurable. Thus,
Ys−1 = E[Ys(1 + xs∆Ws)|Fs−1]. (2.12)
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From here, if Ys ≥ 0 for some s ∈ {t+1, . . . , T}, using the assumption that 1+xs∆Ws > 0, we get
that Ys−1 ≥ 0. Hence, since YT ≥ 0, we conclude that Ys ≥ 0 for all s ∈ {t, . . . , T}.
If 1AYt = 0 for some A ∈ Ft, then, by the above, 1AYs ≥ 0 for all s ∈ {t, . . . , T}. Moreover, by
(2.12) we also have 1AYt = E[1AYt+1(1 + xt+1∆Wt+1|Ft] = 0, and since 1 + xt+1∆Wt+10, we get
1AYt+1(ω) = 0. Similarly, we deduce that 1AYs = 0, s ∈ {t+ 2, . . . , T}.
This concludes the proof.
Lemma 2.5 depicts the comparison result for drivers g of the form g(t, z) = xtz. Using this
result, we will prove next the comparison theorem for a general BS∆E.
Theorem 2.6. Assume that g1, g2 satisfy Assumption A, and Y 1T , Y
2
T ∈ L
2(FT ), and suppose that
for every t ∈ T , the following conditions hold true:
1) Y 1T ≥ Y
2
T ;
2) g1(s, z) ≥ g2(s, z), s ∈ {t, . . . , T}, z ∈ R;
3) |c1s∆Ws| < 1, s ∈ {t, . . . , T}, where c
1 is the Lipschitz coefficient of g1 as defined in A2.
Denote by Y i, i = 1, 2, the solution of (2.1), that corresponds to driver gi, and terminal condition
Y iT , for i = 1, 2. Then, Y
1
s ≥ Y
2
s , for all s ∈ {t, . . . , T}. Moreover, the comparison is strict, in
the sense that if Y 1t = Y
2
t on A ∈ Ft, then 1AY
1
s = 1AY
2
s and 1Ag
1(s, Z2s ) = 1Ag
2(s, Z2s ), for all
s ∈ {t, . . . , T}.
Proof. We prove by backward induction that Y 1t ≥ Y
2
t , for every t ∈ T . By Assumption 1), the
statement holds true for t = T . Assume that Y 1t ≥ Y
2
t for some fixed t ∈ T . Then, by (2.7)
Y 1s−1 − Y
2
s−1 =Y
1
s − Y
2
s + (g
1(s, Z1s )− g
2(s, Z2s ))∆〈W 〉s − (Z
1
s − Z
2
s )∆Ws +∆(M
1
s −M
2
s )
=
[
Y 1s − Y
2
s + (g
1(s, Z1s )− g
1(s, Z2s ))∆〈W 〉s − (Z
1
s − Z
2
s )∆Ws +∆(M
1
s −M
2
s )
]
+
[
(g1(s, Z2s )− g
2(s, Z2s ))∆〈W 〉s
]
=:Y˜s−1 + Y s−1.
Clearly, Assumption 2) implies that Y s−1 ≥ 0. As for Y˜s−1, we write it as
Y˜s−1 = Y
1
s − Y
2
s +
g1(s, Z1s )− g
1(s, Z2s )
Z1s − Z
2
s
(Z1s − Z
2
s )∆〈W 〉s − (Z
1
s − Z
2
s )∆Ws +∆(M
1
s −M
2
s ),
(2.13)
where, as usually, 0/0 = 0. Let us now define g˜(t, z) =
g1(t,Z1t )−g
1(t,Z2t )
Z1t−Z
2
t
z, for t ∈ T and z ∈
R. Since g1(t, z) satisfies Assumption A, then by Proposition A.3, g˜(t, z) is predictable, and by
Assumption A2
|g˜(t, z1)− g˜(t, z2)| = |
g1(t, Z1t )− g
1(t, Z2t )
Z1t − Z
2
t
||z1 − z2| ≤ c
1
t |z1 − z2|.
Moreover, g˜(t, 0) = 0, and hence g˜(t, z) satisfies Assumption A, and Y˜s−1 is the solution to BS∆E
(2.13) with driver g˜(t, z) and terminal condition Y 1s − Y
2
s . Since |
g1(t,Z1t )−g
1(t,Z2t )
Z1t−Z
2
t
| ≤ c1t , in view of
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Assumption 3), |
g1(t,Z1t )−g
1(t,Z2t )
Z1t−Z
2
t
∆Wt| < 1, and thus 1 +
g1(t,Z1t )−g
1(t,Z2t )
Z1t−Z
2
t
∆Wt > 0. From here, using
Lemma 2.5, we get that Y˜s−1 ≥ 0.
From the above arguments, we have that Y 1s−1− Y
2
s−1 = Y˜s−1+Y s−1 ≥ 0, and consequently, by
induction argument Y 1s ≥ Y
2
s , s ∈ {t, . . . , T}.
Finally, if 1AY
1
t = 1AY
2
t , for some A ∈ Ft, then 1AY˜t = 1AY t = 0. By Lemma 2.5, 1AY
1
t+1 =
1AY
2
t+1. Since 1AY t = 0 and 1Ag
1(t+1, Z2t+1) ≥ 1Ag
2(t+1, Z2t+1), then 1Ag
1(t+1, Z2t+1) = 1Ag
2(t+
1, Z2t+1). Similarly, for t+ 1 < s ≤ T , one gets that 1AY
1
s = 1AY
2
s and 1Ag
1(s, Z2s ) = 1Ag
2(s, Z2s ).
The proof is complete.
Corollary 2.7. Let g be a driver that satisfies Assumption A, and let Y 1T , Y
2
T ∈ L
2(FT ) be two
terminal conditions such that Y 1T ≥ Y
2
T Assume that |ct∆Wt| < 1, t ∈ T , where ct is the Lipschitz
coefficient of g. Then, Y 1t ≥ Y
2
t , t ∈ T . Moreover, the comparison is strict in the sense that if
1AY
1
t = 1AY
2
t , for some t ∈ T , A ∈ Ft, then 1AY
1
s = 1AY
2
s , s = t, . . . , T .
Remark 2.8. Using the same ideas, one can show that Theorem 2.6 holds true if Assumption 3) is
replaced by the following assumption:
g1
(
s,
E[Y 1∆Ws|Fs−1]
∆〈W 〉s
)
− g1
(
s,
E[Y 2∆Ws|Fs−1]
∆〈W 〉s
)
≥
E[Y 2 − Y 1|Fs−1]
∆〈W 〉s
, (2.14)
for Y 1, Y 2 ∈ L2(Fs), Y
1 ≥ Y 2, t < s ≤ T , and the equality reached if and only if Y 1 = Y 2.
Assumption (2.14) is weaker than assumption 3) in Theorem 2.6. Indeed, assuming that
|c1s∆Ws| < 1, and Y
1 ≥ Y 2, we then have that
E[Y 1 − Y 2|Fs−1]
∆〈W 〉s
≥
E[|c1s∆Ws|(Y
1 − Y 2)|Fs−1]
∆〈W 〉s
≥ c1s
∣∣∣E[∆Ws(Y 1 − Y 2)|Fs−1]
∆〈W 〉s
∣∣∣ = c1s∣∣∣E[Y 1∆Ws|Fs−1]∆〈W 〉s − E[Y
2∆Ws|Fs−1]
∆〈W 〉s
∣∣∣
≥
∣∣∣g1(s, E[Y 1∆Ws|Fs−1]
∆〈W 〉s
)
− g1
(
s,
E[Y 2∆Ws|Fs−1]
∆〈W 〉s
)∣∣∣.
Hence, inequality (2.14) holds true.
We feel that assumption (2.14) is less intuitive, and cumbersome, and for sake of ease of expo-
sition, in what follows we will use assumption 3) from Theorem 2.6.
Remark 2.9. In [Sta09], the author proves a comparison result for BS∆Es in the limit sense, as
time step goes to zero. It was assumed that that the driver g and the martingale process W satisfy
are such that
|g(t, z1)− g(t, z2)| ≤ K(1 + (|z1|∞ ∨ |z2|∞)
α/2)|z1 − z2|∞;
lim
∆t→0
‖∆Wt‖∞∆〈W 〉
−(α/4)
t = 0, α ∈ [0, 2),
along with some additional technical conditions. In this case, by taking α = 0, and small enough
∆t, we note that g and W will satisfy Assumption B2 from our setup, and hence our comparison
result holds true. In either [Sta09] or our setup, it is required to have control on both the driver
g and the noise W for the comparison theorem to hold. Finally we want to mention that while
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the conditions from [Sta09] and conditions proposed in this work overlap (in some sense), neither
one implies the other. With α = 0, the condition on the driver from [Sta09] is stronger; while for
α > 0, the assumption on the driver is weaker but the condition satisfied by W is more restricted.
In this work, we will mostly work with drivers that satisfy the comparison principle, and for
brevity we will call such drivers regular, with precise definition as follows:
Definition 2.10. Let g be a driver that satisfies Assumption A, and let Y 1T , Y
2
T ∈ L
2(FT ) be two
terminal conditions.
1. We say that the comparison result holds true for BS∆E with driver g, if Y 1T ≥ Y
2
T implies that
Y 1t ≥ Y
2
t , t ∈ T , and the comparison is strict if 1AY
1
t = 1AY
2
t for some t ∈ T , and A ∈ Ft,
then 1AY
1
s = 1AY
2
s , s = t, . . . , T .
2. The driver g is called regular driver if the comparison result holds true for BS∆E with driver g.
Lemma 2.5 implies that a linear driver g(t, z) = xtz is regular if 1+xt∆Wt > 0, for every t ∈ T .
Also, Corollary 2.7 implies that a general driver g is regular if |ct∆Wt| < 1 for every t ∈ T . Next,
we present several examples of regular drivers, where we consider W as a martingale process such
that ∆Wt is uniformly bounded.
Example 2.11. Let the driver g(t, z) = ct|z|, with c such that ‖ct‖∞ <
1
‖∆Wt‖∞
, is a regular
driver. We will show in the next section that such driver generates a family of coherent dynamic
risk measures.
Example 2.12. Let us put
g(t, z) =
K
(K + 1)‖∆Wt‖∞
ln(
1
3
+
1
3
e−z +
1
3
ez),
where K ∈ R+ is fixed. As such, g(t, z) is predictable, g(t, 0) = 0 and g(t, z) is Lipschitz due to the
fact that its derivative with respect to z takes value in (− K(K+1)‖∆Wt‖∞ ,
K
(K+1)‖∆Wt‖∞
). Moreover,
the Lipschitz coefficient ct is such that |ct∆Wt| < 1, according to the fact that |
∂g(t,z)
∂z | ≤
K−1
K‖∆Wt‖∞
.
Thus, the driver g is regular, and the corresponding BSDE has the following form
Yt = YT +
∑
t<s≤T
K
(K + 1)‖∆Wt‖∞
ln(
1
3
+
1
3
e−Zs +
1
3
eZs)∆〈W 〉t −
∑
t<s≤T
Zs∆Ws +MT −Mt.
We will see in the next section, this BS∆E plays an important role in our study, and it is related
to so called convex dynamic risk measures.
2.3 g-Expectations
In the seminal paper [Pen97], the author introduced a relationship between solutions of BSDEs (in
continuous time) and so called nonlinear expectations or g-expectations (see also [CHMP02]). Later,
the theory of nonlinear expectations was successfully applied to some problems from mathematical
finance in the context of theory of risk measures. For more details we refer the reader to [RG06,
BEK07, RGS13] and references therein. Similar approach can be adopted for the case of BS∆Es,
which will be the main goal of this section.
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Towards this end, we will assume that the driver g is a regular driver, and that the terminal
condition X ∈ L2(FT ). As before, we denote by (Yt, Zt,Mt), t ∈ T , the solution of the cor-
responding BS∆E. Analogous to the existing literature on BSDEs (cf. [Pen97]), we define the
conditional g-expectation Eg
[
X
∣∣Ft] of a random variable X given Ft, the random variable given by
Eg
[
X
∣∣Ft] := Yt.
In what follows, it will be convenient to view the space L2(FT ) as an L
∞(Ft)-module, for every
fixed t ∈ T ; saying differently, the random variables from L∞(Ft) will play the role of scalers for
the linear space L2(FT ). For more details on general theory of L
0-modules, and their relationship
to theory of risk and performance measures, we refer the reader to [FKV09, KV09, BCDK13].
Remark 2.13. Throughout the paper we will use the following result, which follows immediately
from the uniqueness of the solutions and backward nature of BS∆Es. Let g be a driver that satisfies
Assumption A, and assume that there exists a triple of processes (Y ′, Z ′,M ′) such that
Y ′u = X +
∑
u<s≤T
g(s, Z ′s)∆〈W 〉s −
∑
u<s≤T
Z ′s∆Ws +M
′
T −M
′
u, u = t, . . . , T,
where Y ′u ∈ L
2(Fu), Z
′
u ∈ L
2(Fu−1), M
′
u ∈ L
2(Fu), and E[M
′
uWu|Fu−1] = M
′
u−1Wu−1. Then,
Y ′t = Eg[X|Ft].
Next result provides some fundamental properties of g-expectations, such as monotonicity, tower
property, convexity when driver is convex, and homogeneity when driver is homogenous.
Proposition 2.14. For any regular driver g, the conditional g-expectation satisfies the following
properties:
(i) Eg[µ|Ft] = µ, for any µ ∈ R, t ∈ T ;
(ii) if X1 ≥ X2, X1,X2 ∈ L2(FT ), then Eg
[
X1
∣∣Ft] ≥ Eg[X2∣∣Ft], for any t ∈ T . Moreover, if
1AEg
[
X1
∣∣Ft] = 1AEg[X2∣∣Ft], for some t ∈ T , and A ∈ Ft, then 1AX1 = 1AX2;
(iii) Eg
[
Eg
[
X
∣∣Fs]∣∣Ft] = Eg[X∣∣Fs∧t], for any X ∈ L2(FT ), s, t ∈ T ;
(iv) Eg
[
1AX
∣∣Ft] = 1AEg[X∣∣Ft], for any X ∈ L2(FT ), A ∈ Ft, t ∈ T ;
(v) Eg
[
X + β
∣∣Ft] = Eg[X∣∣Ft]+ β, for any X ∈ L2(FT ), β ∈ L2(Ft), t ∈ T ;
(vi) if g(u, ω, ·) is convex, for any u ∈ {t, . . . , T}, ω ∈ Ω, that is
g(u, ω, µz1 + (1− µ)z2) ≤ µg(u, ω, z1) + (1− µ)g(u, ω, z2), z1, z2 ∈ R, µ ∈ R, 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1,
then
Eg[λX
1 + (1− λ)X2|Ft] ≤ λEg[X
1|Ft] + (1− λ)Eg[X
2|Ft],
for any X1,X2 ∈ L2(FT ), λ ∈ L
∞(Ft), 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1.
(vii) if g(u, ω, ·) is homogeneous, for any u ∈ {t, . . . , T}, ω ∈ Ω, that is
g(u, ω, µz) = µg(u, ω, z), z, µ ∈ R,
then
Eg[λX|Ft] = λEg[X|Ft], X ∈ L
2(FT ), λ ∈ L
∞(Ft).
12
Proof. (i) If YT = µ ∈ R, then according to (2.5), we get that
ZT =
E[YT∆WT |FT−1]
∆〈W 〉T
= µ
E[∆WT |FT−1]
∆〈W 〉T
= 0.
Hence, by (2.6) and Assumption A3, we have that
YT−1 = E[YT |FT−1] + g(T,ZT )∆〈W 〉T = E[YT |FT−1] = µ.
Inductively, in view of (2.9) and (2.10), we have that Yt = µ for all t ∈ T . Hence, Eg[µ|Ft] = µ,
t ∈ T .
(ii) It follows imediatly from Theorem 2.6.
(iii) Assume that t ≤ s, and let (Y,Z,M) be the solution of BS∆E with terminal condition X.
Then,
Yu = X +
∑
u<r≤T
g(r, Zr)∆〈W 〉r −
∑
u<r≤T
Zr∆Wr +MT −Mu, u ∈ T .
By considering u = t and u = s, we immediately get
Yt = Ys +
∑
t<r≤s
g(r, Zr)∆〈W 〉r −
∑
t<r≤s
Zr∆Wr +Ms −Mt. (2.15)
Next, we consider the BS∆E with driver g, terminal time s and terminal condition Ys. By (2.15)
and definition of g-expectation, we have that Yt = Eg[Ys|Ft], which implies that Eg[X|Ft] =
Eg[Eg[X|Fs]|Ft].
Now, let us assume that t > s. For t = T , then property follows from the definition of g-
expectation For t < T , we us consider the BS∆E with driver g and terminal condition (at time T )
Eg[X|Fs]. In view of (2.5), we have that
ZT =
E[YT∆WT |FT−1]
∆〈W 〉T
= Eg[X|Fs]
E[∆WT |FT−1]
∆〈W 〉T
= 0.
Hence, by (2.6) and Assumption A3, it is true that
YT−1 = E[YT |FT−1] + g(T,ZT )∆〈W 〉T = E[Eg[X|Fs]|FT−1] = Eg[X|Fs].
Inductively, using (2.9) and (2.10), we conclude that Yt = Eg[X|Fs]. Consequently, by the definition
of g-expectation, we finally get that Eg[Eg[X|Fs]|Ft] = Eg[X|Fs].
(iv) Fix t ∈ T , X ∈ L2(FT ), A ∈ Ft, and let (Y,Z,M) be the solution of BS∆E with terminal
condition X. Note that 1Ag(u,Zu) = g(u,1AZu), u = t+ 1, . . . , T , and thus
1AYu = 1AX +
∑
u<s≤T
g(s,1AZs)∆〈W 〉s −
∑
u<s≤T
1AZs∆Ws + 1AMT − 1AMu, (2.16)
for every u = t, . . . , T . Also note that since A ∈ Ft, and u ≥ t + 1, we have that 1AYu ∈ L
2(Fu),
1AZu ∈ L
2(Fu−1), and 1AMu ∈ L
2(Fu), for any u = t+ 1, . . . , T . Due to that fact that M and W
are orthogonal, we note that
E[1AMuWu|Fu−1] = 1AE[MuWu|Fu] = 1AMu−1Wu−1.
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Therefore, in view of (2.16), and Lemma 2.13, we have that 1AYt = Eg[1AX|Ft], which implies that
1AEg[X|Ft] = Eg[1AX|Ft].
(v) If (Yu, Zu,Mu), u ∈ T , be the solution of BS∆E with terminal condition X, then
Yu + β = X + β +
∑
u<s≤T
g(s, Zs)∆〈W 〉s −
∑
u<s≤T
Zs∆Ws +MT −Mu, u = t, . . . , T, (2.17)
for any β ∈ L2(Ft). Clearly Yu + β ∈ L
2(Fu), and hence, by Lemma 2.13 and (2.17), we conclude
that Yt + β = Eg[YT + β|Ft], which implies that
Eg[X|Ft] + β = X + β = Eg[X + β|Ft].
(vi) Let (Y 1u , Z
1
u,M
1
u), and respectively Y
2
u , Z
2
u,M
2
u , u ∈ T , be the solution of BS∆E with
terminal condition X1, and respectively X2. Assuming that g(u, ω, ·) is convex, and using identity
(2.1), we have that
λY 1t + (1− λ)Y
2
t =λX
1 + (1− λ)X2 + λ
∑
t<u≤T
g(u, ω, Z1u)∆〈W 〉u
+ (1− λ)
∑
t<u≤T
g(u, ω, Z2u)∆〈W 〉u − λ
∑
t<u≤T
Z1u∆Wu
− (1− λ)
∑
t<u≤T
Z2u∆Wu + λ(M
1
T −M
1
t ) + (1− λ)(M
2
T −M
2
t )
≥λX1 + (1− λ)X2 +
∑
t<u≤T
g(u, ω, λZ1u + (1− λ)Z
2
u)∆〈W 〉u
−
∑
t<u≤T
(λZ1u + (1− λ)Z
2
u)∆〈W 〉u + λM
1
T + (1− λ)M
2
T
− λM1t − (1− λ)M
2
t , (2.18)
where λ ∈ L∞(Ft), 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. Next we consider the process Y
′ defined as follows
Y ′u =λX
1 + (1− λ)X2 +
∑
u<s≤T
g(s, λZ1s + (1− λ)Z
2
s )∆〈W 〉s
−
∑
u<s≤T
(λZ1s + (1− λ)Z
2
s )∆〈W 〉s + λM
1
T + (1− λ)M
2
T
− λM1u − (1− λ)M
2
u , u = t, . . . , T.
Clearly Y ′u ∈ L
2(Fu), λZ
1
u + (1 − λ)Z
2
u ∈ L
2(Fu−1), λM
1
u + (1 − λ)M
2
u ∈ L
2(Fu), and E[(λM
1
u +
(1 − λ)M2u)Wu|Fu−1] = (λM
1
u−1 + (1 − λ)M
2
u−1)Wu−1, for any u = t + 1, . . . , T . Therefore, by
Lemma 2.13, we have that Y ′t = Eg[λY
1
T +(1−λ)Y
2
T |Ft], combined with (2.18) concludes the proof.
(vii) The proof is similar to the proof of (vi) and we omit it here.
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In what follows, we will call a driver g convex, if g(t, ω, ·) is convex, and g positive homogeneous,
if g(t, ω, ·) is positive homogeneous, for any t ∈ T , ω ∈ Ω. Also, we will simple say that Eg[ · |Ft]
is convex (rather than convex in L0-module sense) if
Eg[λX
1 + (1− λ)X2|Ft] ≤ λEg[X
1|Ft] + (1− λ)Eg[X
2|Ft],
for any λ ∈ L∞(Ft), 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1.
Proposition 2.14 shows that g-expectation (or nonlinear expectation) shares many properties
with usual conditional expectation. However, as name suggests, generally speaking it is not linear.
Next two results show that the g-expectation is linear if and only if the driver is regular and linear.
Proposition 2.15. Assume that g is a regular linear driver. Then Eg[ · |Ft] is linear. Moreover,
there exists a probability measure Q ∼ P such that EQ[X|Ft] = Eg[X|Ft] for all X ∈ L
2(FT ).
Proof. Since g(t, z) is regular, then Eg[ · |Ft] is well defined and Eg[0|Ft] = 0. Assuming that
(Y i, Zi,M i), i = 1, 2, are the solutions of BS∆E (2.1) with terminal condition Xi, i = 1, 2, for any
a, b ∈ Ft, we get
aY 1t + bY
2
t =aY
1
T + bY
2
T +
∑
t<s≤T
xs(aZ
1
s + bZ
2
s )∆〈W 〉s −
∑
t<s≤T
(aZ1s + bZ
2
s )∆Ws
+ (aM1T + bM
2
T )− (aM
1
t + bM
2
t ).
Moreover, aM1t + bM
2
t is orthogonal to Wt, and therefore, aY
1
t + bY
2
t is the solution of BS∆E with
terminal condition aY 1T + bY
2
T . Hence, linearity of Eg[·|Ft] follows.
For any A ∈ F we define Q(A) := Eg[1A]. First, we will verify that Q is a probability measure.
Since 1 + xt∆Wt > 0, then according to Lemma 2.5 we have that Q(A) = Eg[1A] ≥ 0. If A = ∅,
then 1A = 0 almost surely and therefore Q(A) = Eg[0] = 0. If A = Ω, then 1A = 1 and hence
Q(A) = Eg[1] = 1. Let (Ai)
∞
i=1 be such that Ai ∈ F , i ∈ N, and Ai
⋂
Aj = 0, for i 6= j. Let
(Y,Z,M) be the solution of BS∆E with terminal condition
∑∞
i=1 1Ai . Then,
Q(
∞⋃
i=1
Ai) = Eg[
∞∑
i=1
1Ai ] =
∞∑
i=1
1Ai +
∑
t<s≤T
x(s)Zs∆〈W 〉s −
∑
t<s≤T
Zs∆Ws +MT −Mt.
By (2.5), we also have that
ZT =
E[
∑∞
i=1 1Ai∆WT |FT−1]
∆〈W 〉T
.
From here, by Dominated Convergence Theorem, and again by (2.5), we continue
ZT =
∞∑
i=1
E[1Ai∆WT |FT−1]
∆〈W 〉T
=
∞∑
i=1
ZiT ,
where ZiT is the part of the solution corresponding to terminal condition 1Ai , i ∈ N. Similarly,
we have that YT−1 =
∑∞
i=1 Y
i
T−1. Inductively, we have that Y0 =
∑∞
i=1 Y
i
0 , or Q[
⋃∞
i=1Ai] =∑∞
i=1Q[Ai]. Therefore, Q is a probability measure.
Next, we will show that Q is equivalent to P. If A ∈ F , and P(A) = 0, then 1A = 0, P-a.s., and
thus Q(A) = Eg[1A] = 0. Conversely, if Q(A) = 0, then, by Lemma 2.5, 1A = 0 P-a.s., and hence
P(A) = 0. Thus, Q is equivalent to P.
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We are left to show that EQ[X|Ft] = Eg[X|Ft], for any X ∈ L
2(F), t ∈ T . First, we prove the
statement for t = 0. For a simple random variable X =
∑n
i=1 1Aiai ∈ L
2(F), with n ∈ N, Ai ∈ F ,
ai ∈ R, using linearity of g-expectations proved above, we have that EQ[X] = Eg[X]. For a general
random variable we use the standard approximation procedure. If X ∈ L2+(F), then there exists an
increasing, and positive sequence of simple random variable 0 ≤ X1 ≤ X2 ≤ . . . ≤ Xn ≤ . . . ≤ X
such that limn→∞Xn = X, and
EQ[X] = lim
n→∞
EQ[Xn] = lim
n→∞
Eg[Xn].
Using similar procedure as in the first part of the proof, one can show that Y Xn0
a.s.
−→ Y X0 , and thus
Eg[X] = EQ[X]. Finally for the general case, X ∈ L
2(F), it is enough to split X into its positive
and negative part.
From here, and Proposition 2.14, for any t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, A ∈ Ft, and X ∈ L
2(F), we also have
EQ[1AEg[X|Ft]] = Eg[1AEg[X|Ft]] = Eg[Eg[1AX|Ft]] = Eg[1AX] = EQ[1AX],
which implies that Eg[ · |Ft] is equal to the usual conditional expectation.
This concludes the proof.
Proposition 2.16. Assume that g is a regular driver, and Eg[ · |Ft] is linear for any t ∈ T . Then,
there exists a process xt, such that xt is predictable, |xt| ≤ ct, where ct is the Lipschitz coefficient
of g(t, ·), and g(t, z) = xtz, t ∈ T .
Proof. Fix t ∈ T . Let us consider a BS∆E from time t − 1 to terminal time t, and with driver
g. For any fixed z1, z2 ∈ R, it is straightforward to verify that Z1t = az
1, M1t = 0, Y
1
t−1 =
g(t, az1)∆〈W 〉t, and respectively Z
2
t = bz
2, M2t = 0, Y
2
t−1 = g(t, bz
2)∆〈W 〉t, is the solution to
this BS∆E with terminal values az1∆Wt, and respectively bz
2∆Wt, where a, b are arbitrary real
numbers. Consequently, Z0t = az
1 + bz2, M0t = 0, Y
0
t−1 = g(t, az
1 + bz2)∆〈W 〉t is the solution to
the BS∆E with terminal condition (az1 + bz2)∆Wt.
By the definition of g-expectation, and using its linearity, we have
g(t, az1 + bz2)∆〈W 〉t = Eg[(az
1 + bz2)∆Wt|Ft−1]
= aEg[z
1∆Wt|Ft−1] + bEg[z
2∆Wt|Ft−1]
= ag(t, z1)∆〈W 〉t + bg(t, z
2)∆〈W 〉t.
From here, since ∆〈W 〉t 6= 0, and since z
1 and z2 were arbitrarily chosen, we have that
g(t, ω, az1 + bz2) = ag(t, ω, z1) + bg(t, ω, z2), ω ∈ Ω, z1, z2, a, b ∈ R.
Note that since g(t, ω, ·) is Lipschitz, hence continuous, there exists a random variable xt(ω) such
that g(t, ω, z) = xt(ω)z, ω ∈ Ω, z ∈ R.
Finally, recall that g is predictable, and thus xt is predictable too. Moreover, by Assumption A2,
|xt(ω)z1 − xt(ω)z2| = |g(t, ω, z1)− g(t, ω, z2)| ≤ ct(ω)|z1 − z2|
for any ω ∈ Ω, z1, z2 ∈ R, t ∈ T . Therefore, |xt| ≤ ct, and this completes the proof.
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3 Dynamic Convex Risk Measures and Dynamic Acceptability In-
dices via g-Expectation
In this section we will explore the connections between g-Expectation and Dynamic Convex Risk
Measures (DCRMs), and consequently the relationship between DCRMs and Dynamic Acceptabil-
ity Indices (DAIs).
In the seminal paper [ADEH99], the authors proposed an axiomatic approach to defining risk
measures that are meant to give a numerical value of the riskiness of a given financial contract
or portfolio. Since then, an extensive body of work was devoted to exploration of the axiomatic
approach to risk measures, and it is beyond the scope of this paper to list all the relevant literature
on this subject. We refer the reader to [DK13] for an excellent overview of the static (one period of
time) risk measures, as well as to the survey paper [AP11] on dynamic risk measures. The values
of risk measures can be interpreted as the capital requirement for the purpose of regulating the
risk assumed by market participants (typically, by banks). In particular, the risk measures are
generalizations of the well-known Value-At-Risk (V@R). Following a similar axiomatic approach,
Cherny and Madan [CM09] introduced the notion of coherent acceptability index – function defined
on a set of random variables that takes positive values and that are monotone, quasi-concave, and
scale invariant. Coherent acceptability indices can be viewed as generalizations of performance
measures such as Sharpe Ratio, Gain to Loss Ratio, Risk Adjusted Return on Capital. Coherent
acceptability indices appear to be a tool very well tailored to assessing both risk and reward of a
given cashflow. The dynamic version of coherent acceptability indices was studied in [BCZ14].
For a robust representations of general dynamic quasi-concave, monotone and local maps see,
for instance, [BCDK13].
As it was shown in [RG06] there is a direct connection between convex risk measures and
nonlinear expectations, and consequently there exists a direct link between convex risk measures
and BSDEs. These connections were further studied in [CE11b], [ESC15], and [Sta09] for the case
of discrete time setups, thus establishing a relationship between BS∆Es and DRM for terminal
cashflows (random variables).
In [CM09, BCZ14] the authors proved that any (dynamic) coherent acceptability index can
be associated with a family of (dynamic) coherent risk measures. Consequently, in [RGS13] the
authors study the relationship between dynamic sub-scale invariant performance measures and
dynamic convex risk measures and their connections to BS∆Es. The aim of this section is to
develop a unified framework for assessing the risk and performance of cash-flows in a dynamic,
discrete time setup. It is well known that one of the key properties of dynamic risk and performance
measures is their time consistency, and in this paper, we also pay special attention to this property.
We refer the reader to [BCP14] for a thorough discussion of various forms of time consistency of
risk/performance measures.
Besides the usual applications of these measures to risk management, and assessment of port-
folios performance, we will show in next sections that dynamic sub-scale invariant acceptability
indices, nonlinear expectations and theory of BS∆Es can be successfully applied to build to build
a general, arbitrage free, nonlinear pricing methodology in complex derivative markets.
For sake of consistency, we will follow the setup from [BCIR13, BCZ14, BCR12] adapted to a
general probability space. A cash-flow, also called a dividend process, denoted as D = {Dt}
T
t=0,
is any real valued, square integrable, stochastic process adapted to filtration F. The set of all
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cash-flows is denoted by D, that is
D :=
{
(Dt)
T
t=0 : (Dt)
T
t=0 is an adapted process, Dt ∈ L
2(Ft), t ∈ T
}
.
From financial point of view, an element D ∈ D should be interpreted as a cash-flow associated
with a portfolio, or general financial instrument, such that the amount Dt is received/paid by the
holder at time t ∈ T . More details, and for more general setup, please see next chapter.
For any D ∈ D, λ ∈ L∞(Ft), we define the following multiplicative operator
λ ·t D := (0, . . . , 0, λDt, . . . , λDT ).
Note that for any t ∈ T , the set D is closed under the multiplication ·t. In what follows, if no
confusion arise, we will simply write λD instead of λ ·tD. We also define an order t on D, and say
that D1 t D
2, whenever
∑T
s=tD
1
s ≥
∑T
s=tD
2
s , t ∈ T . Hence, D
1 t D
2 if the future cumulative
cash-flow is respectively larger.
3.1 Dynamic Convex Risk Measures via g-Expectation
We start by recalling the definition of Dynamic Convex/Coherent Risk Measures.
Definition 3.1 (Dynamic Convex Risk Measure). A dynamic convex risk measure is a function
ρ : T ×D × Ω→ R that satisfies the following properties:
R1. Adapted. ρt(D) is Ft-measurable, for any t ∈ T ,D ∈ D.
R2. Local. 1Aρt(D) = 1Aρt(1AD), for any t ∈ T , A ∈ Ft,D ∈ D.
R3. Convex. ρt(λD+(1−λ)D
′) ≤ λρt(D)+(1−λ)ρt(D
′), for any t ∈ T , λ ∈ L∞(Ft), 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1,
D,D′ ∈ D.
R4. Monotone. If D t D
′ for some t ∈ T , D,D′ ∈ D, then ρt(D) ≤ ρt(D
′).
R5. Cash-additive. ρt(D + m1{s}) = ρt(D) − m for any t ∈ T , D ∈ D, and Ft-measurable
random variable m and s ≥ t.
R6. Time consistent. ρt(D) = ρt(−ρt+1(D)1{t+1})−Dt for any t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1 and D ∈ D.
If ρ furthermore is
R7. Positive-homogeneous. ρt(λD) = λρt(D), λ ∈ L
∞
+ (Ft),
then ρ : T × D × Ω→ R is called a dynamic coherent risk measure.
Properties R1-R7 have a clear financial interpellation: adaptiveness means that the measure-
ments are consistent with the flow of information; the locality property essentially means that the
values of the risk measure restricted to a set A ∈ F remain invariant with respect to the values of the
arguments outside of the same set A ∈ F , and in particular, the events that will not happen in the
future do not change the value of the measure today; convexity implies that diversification reduces
the risk; monotonicity implies that a cashflow with higher payoffs bears less risk. Cash-additivity
means that adding $m to a portfolio at any time in the future reduces the overall risk by the same
amount m. From the regulatory perspective, the value of a risk measure is typically interpreted as
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the minimal capital requirement for a bank. There exists various forms of time consistency of risk
and performance measures and we refer the reader to recent paper [BCP14] where the authors give
a systematic approach to time consistency of LM-measures (local and monotone functions). The
time consistency R6 for DCRM considered here is known in the existing literature as strong time
consistency. It can be shown that property R6, combined with R4, is equivalent to the following
property: if Dt = D
′
t and ρt+1(D) = ρt+1(D
′), then ρt(D) = ρt(D
′), i.e. if two cashflows bear the
same risk tomorrow, and they pay the same dividend today, then today these two cashflows are
assess at the same risk level. Saying differently, the risk is measured consistently in time. Finally,
positive-homogeneity means the risk of a rescaled cashflow is rescaled by the same factor.
Similar to, [CE11b, ESC15, Sta09] that address discrete time case, and [RG06, RGS13] that
consider the continuous time setup, we will show that the solution of BS∆Es (2.1) with convex
drivers, more precisely the corresponding g-Expectation, generates a DCRM. In the sequel, for any
regular and convex driver g, we will denote by ρg the function defined as follows
ρgt (D) = Eg[−
T∑
s=t
Ds|Ft], t ∈ T , D ∈ D. (3.1)
Theorem 3.2. Assume that g is a convex and regular driver. Then, the function ρgt is a DCRM.
Proof. Invoking Proposition 2.14, it is straightforward to show that ρgt satisfies Properties R1–R5.
We will show that ρg is time consistent. By Proposition 2.14 (iii) and (v), we immediately have
that
ρgt (−ρ
g
t+1(D)1{t+1})−Dt =Eg[ρ
g
t+1(D)|Ft]−Dt = Eg[Eg[−
T∑
s=t+1
Ds|Ft+1]|Ft]−Dt
=Eg[Eg[−
T∑
s=t
Ds|Ft+1]|Ft] = Eg[−
T∑
s=t
Ds|Ft]
=ρgt (D),
for any t ∈ T , D ∈ D. This concludes the proof.
As an immediate consequence of Theorem 3.2, if additionally the driver g is positive homoge-
neous in z, then ρg is a time consistent coherent risk measure.
Corollary 3.3. Assume that g(t, z) is a convex and regular driver, such that g(t, ·) is positive
homogeneous. Then, ρgt is a dynamic coherent risk measure.
Proof. In view of Theorem 3.2, we have that ρgt (D) is a time consistent DCRM. Moreover, for any
fixed t ∈ T , due to Proposition 2.14 (vii), we have that
ρgt (λD) = Eg[−λ
T∑
s=t
Ds|Ft] = λEg[−
T∑
s=t
Ds|Ft] = λρ
g
t (D),
for any λ ∈ L∞+ (Ft), and D ∈ D. Hence, ρ
g
t is a time consistent coherent risk measure.
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Next, we give some examples of DCRMs generated by various drivers via g-expectation. Similar
to Example 2.11 and 2.12, in the following two examples, we will assume that W is a martingale
process such that ∆Wt is uniformly bounded.
Example 3.4 (Coherent Case). We consider the driver g(t, z) = c|z|, for some fixed c ∈ [0, 1). It is
easy to see that g(t, z) is convex and positive homogeneous with respect to z. Then, by Corollary
3.3, ρgt (D) = Eg[−
∑T
s=tDs|Ft] is a dynamic coherent risk measure.
Example 3.5 (Convex Case). Let us put
g(t, z) =
K
(K + 1)‖∆Wt‖∞
ln(
1
3
+
1
3
e−z +
1
3
ez),
where K ∈ R+ is fixed. Note that ∂g∂z is an increasing function with respect to z, and hence g(t, ·)
is a convex driver. By Theorem 3.2, we have that ρgt (D) = Eg[−
∑T
s=tDs|Ft] is a time consistent
DCRM.
By Theorem 3.2 any given convex regular driver g generates DCRM. Next result shows that
the converse implication also holds true if W is the symmetric random walk and the filtration is
generated by W .
Proposition 3.6. Assume that W is a symmetric random walk, F = FW , and ρt : L
∞(FT ) →
L∞(Ft) is a DCRM. Also, let g(t, z) =
ρt−1(z∆Wt)
∆〈W 〉t
. Then, ρt(X) = ρ
g
t (X), for any X ∈ L
∞(FT ).
Proof. Fix an X ∈ L∞(FT ). Since ρt(X) ∈ L∞(Ft) ⊂ L2(Ft), for any t ∈ T , then, since W has
the martingale representation property (cf. Proposition A.1), there exists Zt ∈ Ft−1 such that
ρt(X) = E[ρt(X)|Ft−1] + Zt∆Wt. According to time-consistency property of ρ, we have that
ρt(X)− ρt−1(X) =ρt(X) − ρt−1(−ρt(X))
=E[ρt(X)|Ft−1] + Zt∆Wt − E[ρt(X)|Ft−1]− ρt−1(Zt∆Wt)
=− ρt−1(Zt∆Wt) + Zt∆Wt.
Therefore,
ρt−1(X) = ρt(X) +
ρt−1(Zt∆Wt)
∆〈W 〉t
∆〈W 〉t − Zt∆Wt
and hence, ρt(X) = ρ
g
t (X).
The next example is an application of Proposition 3.6.
Example 3.7 (Dynamic Entropic Risk Measure). The dynamic entropic risk measure takes the
following form
ργt (X) = γ ln(E[exp(−
X
γ
)|Ft])
where γ > 0. So the driver corresponding to entropic risk measure will be
g(t, z) =
γ
∆〈W 〉t
ln(E[exp(−
z∆Wt
γ
)|Ft−1]) =
γ
∆〈W 〉t
ln(
1
2
e−
z
γ +
1
2
e
z
γ ).
Similarly as in Example 3.5, we have that g(t, z) is a convex regular driver.
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3.2 Dynamic Acceptability Indices via g-Expectation
In [CM09] the authors introduced the notion of coherent acceptability index, meant to measure
the performance of a given terminal cashflow, as a monotone, scale-invariant, and quasi-concave
function defined on the set of all bounded random variables. The extension of these measures to
a dynamic setup was studied in [BCZ14], where the appropriate notion of time consistency for
dynamic coherent acceptability indices was introduced. In [BCZ14], the author follow a discrete
time market setup on a finite probability space. Recently, Biagini and Bion-Nadal [BBN14] studied
these type of dynamic performance measure of terminal cash-flows on a general probability space,
and discrete time market setup. For robust representations of general dynamic quasi-concave
performance measures we refer the reader to [BCDK13]. The aim of this section is to study
dynamic performance measures that are sub-scale invariance. Following [RGS13], who argued that
the scale invariance fails to capture all risks in an illiquid market, and, accordingly, postulated
the sub-scale invariance instead, we replace the scale invariance condition used in [BCZ14], with a
weaker assumption of sub-scale invariance.
Definition 3.8 (Dynamic Acceptability Index). A dynamic acceptability index is a function α :
T × D ×Ω→ [0,∞] that satisfies the following properties:
I1. Adapted. αt(D) is Ft-measurable, for any t ∈ T ,D ∈ D.
I2. Local. 1Aαt(D) = 1Aαt(1AD), for any t ∈ T , A ∈ Ft,D ∈ D.
I3. Quasi-concave. If αt(D) ≥ m and αt(D
′) ≥ m for some positive Ft-measurable random
variable m, and D,D′ ∈ D, then αt(λD + (1− λ)D
′) ≥ m, for any λ ∈ L∞(Ft), 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1.
I4. Monotone. If D t D
′ for some t ∈ T , and D,D′ ∈ D, then αt(D) ≥ αt(D
′).
I5. Sub-scale Invariant. αt(λD) ≥ αt(D) for any λ ∈ L
∞(Ft), 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, D ∈ D, or,
equivalently, αt(λD) ≤ αt(D) for any λ ∈ L
∞(Ft), λ ≥ 1, D ∈ D.
I6. Time Consistent. For any t ∈ T , D,D′ ∈ D, the following implication holds true
αt+1(D) ≥ m ≥ αt+1(D
′) ⇒ αt(D) ≥ m ≥ αt(D
′),
whenever Dt ≥ 0 ≥ D
′
t, and m being an non-negative Ft-measurable random variable.
Remark 3.9. (i) We note that property I5 is weaker than the scale invariance property
I5’. Scale Invariant. αt(λD) = αt(D) for any λ ∈ L
∞(Ft), λ > 0, D ∈ D,
(ii) If property I5 from the definition of DAI is replaced with I5’, then α is called dynamic coherent
acceptability index.
Analogously to [BCZ14, CM09], we will show that a DAI can be generated by a family of
DCRMs, and hence by a family of BS∆Es. For this, we will consider families of drivers that satisfy
the following assumptions:
Assumption G:
G1. gx2 ≥ gx1 for x2 ≥ x1 > 0;
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G2. gx is a convex regular driver for any x > 0.
G3. gx = gx− for any (t, ω, z) ∈ R
+ × Ω× R;
Towards this end, with slight abuse of notations, we will denote by g the family of drivers (gx)x>0.
In what follows, for any family of drivers g that satisfy assumption G, we denote by αg the
following function
αgt (D)(ω) := sup
{
x ∈ R, x > 0 : Egx
[
−
T∑
s=t
Ds
∣∣∣Ft](ω) ≤ 0}, ω ∈ Ω, t ∈ T , D ∈ D. (3.2)
Then we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.10. Assume that the family of drivers g = (gx)x>0 satisfies Assumption G. Then, α
g
t
is a dynamic acceptability index.
The proof will follow from a series of lemmas proved below.
Lemma 3.11. Assume that the family of drivers g = (gx)x>0 satisfies Assumption G. Then, α
g
t
satisfies properties I1-I5.
Proof. We will show that αgt satisfies properties I1-I5.
I1. Let us consider the set Aγ = {ω ∈ Ω : α
g
t (D)(ω) ≥ γ}, where γ ∈ R, t ∈ T and D ∈ D are
fixed. We want to show that Aγ ∈ Ft. If γ ≤ 0, then it is clear that Aγ = Ω ∈ Ft. For γ > 0, we
will prove that
αgt (D)(ω) ≥ γ, ω ∈ Ω,
is equivalent to
Egγ
[
−
T∑
s=t
Ds
∣∣∣Ft](ω) ≤ 0, ω ∈ Ω. (3.3)
According to definition (3.2), any ω ∈ Ω such that αgt (D)(ω) ≥ γ satisfies that
sup
{
x ∈ R, x > 0 : Egx
[
−
T∑
s=t
Ds
∣∣∣Ft](ω) ≤ 0} ≥ γ,
which, by assumption G1, implies that
lim
x↑γ
Egx
[
−
T∑
s=t
Ds
∣∣∣Ft](ω) ≤ 0.
Therefore, in order to show (3.3) holds for such ω, we only need to verify that
lim
x↑γ
Egx
[
−
T∑
s=t
Ds
∣∣∣Ft](ω) = Egγ[− T∑
s=t
Ds
∣∣∣Ft](ω) ω ∈ Aγ . (3.4)
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Let (Y x, Zx,Mx), 0 < x ≤ γ, be the solutions of BS∆Es with drivers gx and the terminal condition
Y xT = −
∑T
s=tDs. Then, (3.4) is implied by
lim
x↑γ
Y xt = Y
γ
t , (3.5)
which holds clearly for t = T .
Suppose that (3.5) is true for some t < u ≤ T . According to (2.9), we have the representation:
Zxu =
E[Y xu ∆Wu|Fu−1]
∆〈W 〉u
.
Notice that {Y xu }0<x<γ is increasing with respect to x because of Theorem 2.6. Hence, by dominated
convergence theorem, we get that
lim
x↑γ
Zxu = lim
x↑γ
E[Y xu ∆Wu|Fu−1]
∆〈W 〉u
=
E[Y γu ∆Wu|Fu−1]
∆〈W 〉u
= Zγu .
Next, by (2.10), Y xu−1 can be represented by
Y xu−1 = E[Y
x
u |Fu−1] + gx(u,Z
x
u)∆〈W 〉u,
where the following equality
lim
x↑γ
E[Y xu |Fu−1] = E[Y
γ
u |Fu−1]
holds true due to dominated convergence theorem. Moreover, we have that
|gx(u, ω, Z
x
u (ω))− gγ(u, ω, Z
γ
u (ω))|
≤|gx(u, ω, Z
x
u (ω))− gx(u, ω, Z
γ
u (ω))|+ |gx(u, ω, Z
γ
u (ω))− gγ(u, ω, Z
γ
u (ω))|
≤cxt (ω)|Z
x
u(ω)− Z
γ
u(ω)|+ |gx(u, ω, Z
γ
u (ω))− gγ(u, ω, Z
γ
u (ω))|,
for almost all ω ∈ Ω. Recall that cxt (ω) is defined as the smallest Lipschitz constant of gx. Since
that the family of drivers satisfy assumption G1 and G2, then by Proposition A.2, we have that
cxt ≤ c
γ
t . The following equality follows immediately:
lim
x↑γ
gx(u,Z
x
u) = gγ(u,Z
γ
u)
Thus, we have proved
lim
x↑γ
Y xu−1 = Y
γ
u−1,
and (3.5) is true by induction.
On the other hand, for any ω ∈ Ω such that Egγ
[
−
∑T
s=tDs
∣∣Ft](ω) ≤ 0. We get that
αgt (D)(ω) = sup
{
x ∈ R, x > 0 : Egx
[
−
T∑
s=t
Ds
∣∣∣Ft](ω) ≤ 0} ≥ γ,
which implies that ω ∈ Aγ . In view of the above, we conclude that
Aγ =
{
ω ∈ Ω : αgt (D)(ω) ≥ γ
}
=
{
ω ∈ Ω : Egγ
[
−
T∑
s=t
Ds
∣∣∣Ft](ω) ≤ 0}.
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Since that Egγ
[
−
∑T
s=tDs
∣∣Ft] is Ft-measurable, then Aγ ∈ Ft. This completes the proof of showing
that αg is adapted.
I2. Let us fix t ∈ T , D ∈ D, and A ∈ Ft. Then, for almost all ω ∈ Ω, we have that
1A(ω)α
g
t (D)(ω) =1A(ω) sup
{
x ∈ R, x > 0 : Egx
[
−
T∑
s=t
Ds
∣∣∣Ft](ω) ≤ 0}
=1A(ω) sup
{
x ∈ R, x > 0 : 1A(ω)Egx
[
−
T∑
s=t
Ds
∣∣∣Ft](ω) ≤ 0}.
By (v) in Proposition 2.14, we deduce that 1AEgx [−
∑T
s=tDs|Ft] = Egx [−1A
∑T
s=tDs|Ft], and
locality of α follows immediately.
I3. Let us fix t ∈ T , D, D′ ∈ D. Also, let γ > 0 be some Ft-measurable random variable such
that αgt (D)(ω) ≥ γ(ω) and α
g
t (D
′)(ω) ≥ γ(ω) hold for almost all ω. Fix one such ω and denote
γ∗ = γ(ω). Similar to the proof of adaptiveness, we have that αgt (D)(ω) ≥ γ
∗ and αgt (D
′)(ω) ≥ γ∗
will imply that
Egγ(ω)
[
−
T∑
s=t
Ds
∣∣∣Ft](ω) = Egγ∗ [− T∑
s=t
Ds
∣∣∣Ft](ω) ≤ 0,
Egγ(ω)
[
−
T∑
s=t
D′s
∣∣∣Ft](ω) = Egγ∗ [− T∑
s=t
D′s
∣∣∣Ft](ω) ≤ 0,
respectively. Then according to (vi) in Proposition 2.14, we get that
Egγ(ω)
[
−
T∑
s=t
(
λDs + (1− λ)D
′
s
)∣∣∣Ft](ω) ≤ 0,
holds for almost all ω ∈ Ω, and it implies that
αgt (λD + (1− λ)D
′)(ω) = sup
{
x ∈ R, x > 0 : Egx
[
−
T∑
s=t
(
λDs + (1− λ)D
′
s
)∣∣∣Ft](ω) ≤ 0} ≥ γ(ω).
Therefore, the Quasi-concavity of αgt holds.
I4. Fix t ∈ T . Let D, D′ ∈ D, and suppose that D t D
′. For any fixed Ft-measurable random
variable γ > 0 such that αgt (D
′) ≥ γ, we have that
Egγ(ω)
[
−
T∑
s=t
D′s
∣∣∣Ft](ω) ≤ 0
holds for almost every ω ∈ Ω. Due to the assumption D t D
′, which implies that
∑T
s=tDs ≥∑T
s=tD
′
s, we get by (ii) in Proposition 2.14 that
Egγ(ω)
[
−
T∑
s=t
Ds
∣∣∣Ft](ω) ≤ Egγ(ω)[− T∑
s=t
D′s
∣∣∣Ft](ω) ≤ 0,
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and the statement αgt (D) ≥ γ follows. Hence, α
g
t is monotone.
I5. Fix t ∈ T , D ∈ D. For any fixed Ft-measurable random variable γ > 0 such that α
g
t (D) ≥ γ,
we have that
Egγ(ω)
[
−
T∑
s=t
D′s
∣∣∣Ft](ω) ≤ 0
holds for almost every ω ∈ Ω. By convexity of g-expectation, it is true that
Egγ(ω)
[
− λ
T∑
s=t
Ds
∣∣∣Ft] ≤ λEgγ(ω)[− T∑
s=t
Ds
∣∣∣Ft]+ (1− λ)Egγ(ω)[0∣∣∣Ft]
= λEgγ(ω)
[
−
T∑
s=t
Ds
∣∣∣Ft] ≤ 0,
for any λ ∈ L∞(Ft), 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, and almost all ω ∈ Ω. Therefore, we conclude that α
g
t (λD) ≥ γ,
which implies that αgt (λD) ≥ α
g
t (D).
Remark 3.12. In Assumption G, G1 and G2 are natural conditions for constructing DAI via g-
expectation. The reason to assume G3 comes from duality between DCRM and DAI. If a DAI is
given, then DCRM can be defined as
ργt (D) = ess inf{c ∈ Ft : α
g
t (D + c1{t}) ≥ γ},
which is equivalent to
ργt (D) = ess inf
{
c ∈ Ft : ess sup
{
x > 0 : Egx
[
−
T∑
s=t
Ds − c1{t}
∣∣∣Ft] ≤ 0} ≥ γ}.
So we have that,
ργt (D) = ess inf
{
c ∈ Ft : ess sup
{
x > 0 : Egx
[
−
T∑
s=t
Ds
∣∣∣Ft] ≤ c1{t}} ≥ γ}.
Random variable ργt (D) can be represented as
ργt (D) = ess inf
{
c ∈ Ft : ∀ε > 0, Egγ−ε
[
−
T∑
s=t
Ds
∣∣∣Ft] ≤ c},
Hence, we get that ργt (D) = supε>0{Egγ−ε [−
∑T
s=tDs|Ft]} = Egγ− [−
∑T
s=tDs|Ft]. In order for
duality to hold, it is required to have that ρ
gγ
t (D) = ρ
γ
t (D) which is equivalent to follows
Egγ−
[
−
T∑
s=t
Ds
∣∣∣Ft] = Egγ[− T∑
s=t
Ds
∣∣∣Ft].
Finally, according to comparison theorem, we have that gγ = gγ−.
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Lemma 3.13. Assume that the family of drivers g = (gx)x>0 satisfies Assumption G. Also suppose
that gx is positive homogeneous for any x ∈ R
+. Then, αgt is scale invariant.
Proof. We need to show that αgt is scale invariant.
Let t ∈ T , D ∈ D, and λ ∈ L∞(Ft), λ > 0. By definition, we have that
αgt (λD) = ess sup{x > 0 : Egx[−λ
T∑
s=t
Ds|Ft] ≤ 0}.
In view of the fact that gx(t, ·) is positive homogeneous for any x > 0, Proposition 2.14 (vii) implies
that
αgt (λD) = ess sup{x > 0 : λEgx[−
T∑
s=t
Ds|Ft] ≤ 0}.
Since λ > 0, then we get that λEgx[−
∑T
s=tDs|Ft] ≤ 0 is equivalent to Egx [−
∑T
s=tDs|Ft] ≤ 0.
Hence, αgt (λD) = ess sup{x > 0 : Egx [−
∑T
s=tDs|Ft] ≤ 0} = α
g
t (D). This concludes that α
g
t is a
dynamic coherent acceptability index.
By using the following lemma, we will prove that αgt is time consistent.
Lemma 3.14. Assume that the family of drivers g = (gx)x>0 satisfies Assumption G. Also suppose
that Dt ≥ 0 ≥ D
′
t for some t ∈ T , D,D
′ ∈ D, and there exists c ∈ R+, A ∈ Ft such that
1Aα
g
t+1(D) ≥ 1Ac ≥ 1Aα
g
t+1(D
′). Then 1Aα
g
t (D) ≥ 1Ac ≥ 1Aα
g
t (D
′).
Proof. Suppose that 1Aα
g
t (D) ≥ 1Ac ≥ 1Aα
g
t (D
′) for some t ∈ T , c ∈ R+, A ∈ Ft, and D,D
′ ∈ D
such that Dt ≥ 0 ≥ D
′
t. Then, for any β < c, we have that Egβ [−1A
∑T
s=t+1Ds|Ft+1] ≤ 0. Since
Dt ≥ 0, then according to Proposition 2.14 (ii) and (iii), we get that
Egβ
[
− 1A
T∑
s=t
Ds
∣∣∣Ft] = −1ADt + Egβ[Egβ[− 1A T∑
s=t+1
Ds
∣∣∣Ft+1]Ft] ≤ 0.
Due to the fact that β is arbitrary, the following is true:
1Aα
g
t (D) = 1A ess sup
{
x > 0 : Egx
[
−
T∑
s=t
Ds
∣∣∣Ft] ≤ 0}
= 1A ess sup
{
x > 0 : Egx
[
− 1A
T∑
s=t
Ds
∣∣∣Ft] ≤ 0}
≥ 1Ac.
On the other hand, by knowing that 1Aα
g
t+1(D
′) ≤ 1Ac, we will prove 1Aα
g
t (D
′) ≤ 1Ac by contra-
diction. Assume that there exists some A′ ⊂ A, P(A′) > 0 such that αgt (D
′) > c on A′. Then there
exists a β > c and A′′ ⊂ A, P(A′′) > 0 such that αgt (D) > β on A”. Hence, we have that
Egβ
[
− 1A′′
T∑
s=t
D′s
∣∣∣Ft] ≤ 0.
26
However, since αgt+1(D
′) ≤ c on A, then αgt+1(D
′) < β on A′′. In view of the fact that D′t ≤ 0, we
get for ω ∈ A′′ that
Egβ
[
− 1A′′
T∑
s=t
D′s
∣∣∣Ft](ω) = −1A′′(ω)D′t(ω) + Egβ[Egβ[− 1A′′ T∑
s=t+1
D′s
∣∣∣Ft+1∣∣∣Ft](ω) > 0.
Hence, there is a contradiction and such result implies that 1Aα
g
t (D
′) ≤ 1Ac.
Now we are ready to finish proving Theorem 3.10, which is to verify that αgt is time consistent.
Lemma 3.15. Assume that the family of drivers g = (gx)x>0 satisfies Assumption G. Then, α
g
t
satisfies I6.
Proof. For any t ∈ T , D ∈ D, if there exists a positive Ft-measurable random variable m such that
αgt+1(D) ≥ m, then there exists a sequence of simple random variables φn =
∑k
i=1 1A
n
i
ani where
Ani ∈ Ft, a
n
i ∈ R
+, n ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, such that φn ≤ φn+1 and limn→∞ φn = m. Hence, we have that
αgt+1(D) ≥ φn for any n. Since that Dt ≥ 0, then according to locality of α
g
t and Lemma 3.14, The
following is true
αgt (D) ≥ φn, n ∈ {1, 2, . . .}.
Therefore, we conclude that αgt (D) ≥ m.
Assume that there exists a positive Ft-measurable random variable m such that α
g
t+1(D
′) ≤ m.
Fix N ∈ R+, and for any ω ∈ Ω, define
mN (ω) =
{
m(ω) if m(ω) < N,
N if m(ω) ≥ N.
It is clear that (αgt+1)N (D
′) ≤ mN and mN is bounded. Hence, there exists a sequence of simple
random variables φn such that φn ≥ mN , and limn→∞ φn = mN . Therefore (α
g
t+1)N (D
′) ≤ φn for
all n. Since D′t ≤ 0, then by locality of α
g
t and Lemma 3.14, we have that (α
g
t )N (D
′) ≤ φn for any
n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , }. Moreover, it implies that (αgt )N (D
′) ≤ mN . Let N go to infinity, we conclude that
αgt (D
′) ≤ m.
Before proceed to the next section, we give several examples of DAIs generated by g-expectations.
While discussing these examples, we take W as a symmetric random walk.
Example 3.16 (Quasi-concave Case). Let g = (gx)x>0 be in the form of gx(t, z) =
x
(x+1) ln(
1
3 +
1
3e
−z + 13e
z). Similar to Example 3.5, we have that each gx(t, z) a convex regular driver. For fixed
t, z, gx(t, z) is increasing with respect to x. Therefore, g satisfies Assumption G. Moreover, α
g
t (D)
is a DAI.
Example 3.17 (Coherent Case). Let g = (gx)x>0 be in the form of gx(t, z) =
x
x+1 |z|. Then g
satisfies Assumption G. Moreover, gx(t, ·) is positive homogeneous. According to Lemma 3.13,
αgt (D) is a dynamic coherent acceptability index.
Example 3.18 (Entropic Case). Let g = (gx)x>0 be such that
gx(t, z) =
1
x∆〈W 〉t
ln(
1
2
e−xz +
1
2
exz).
Then, due to Example 3.7, such family of drivers satisfies Assumption G, and will generate a DAI,
to which we refer as DAI corresponding to entropic risk measures.
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4 Dynamic Conic Finance as Market Model
Cherny and Madan [CM10] proposed the conic finance framework for pricing non-dividend paying
securities using static acceptability indices. In [BCIR13], the authors generalized such technique
to a dynamic framework that allows cash flows to pay dividends and be subjected to transaction
costs by using dynamic coherent acceptability indices that were obtained in [BCZ14]. Nevertheless,
in [AS08] and [RGS13], the authors presented a systematic criticism to the positive homogeneity
and sublinearity assumptions frequently adopted in the framework of coherent risk measures, and
Bion-Nadal [BN09] introduced a dynamic approach to bid and ask prices taking into account both
transaction costs and liquidity risk, based on Time Consistent Pricing Procedures. In this section,
we will build a market model in which the securities are priced by an acceptability method. Such
set-up is subjected to transaction costs and liquidity risk, by using the dynamic quasi-concave
acceptability indices via g-expectations we developed earlier.
4.1 Market Set-up
In this section we retain the same probabilistic framework and the same notations as in the previous
sections. In particular, we consider an underlying probability space (Ω,F ,F = {Ft}t∈T ,P), and we
assume that all processes considered below are F-adapted and appropriately integrable. On this
probability space we consider a market consisting of a banking account (or money market account)
and K securities. Throughout, we pick the T as the largest time horizon. We also adopt the
convention that all security prices are already discounted with the banking account. Our market
is further characterized as follows:
(M1) The process (Dask,it )t∈T ∈ D, with D
ask,i
0 = 0, represents the dividend process associated
with holding a long position of 1 share of the ith security, i = 1, . . . ,K. Correspondingly,
(Dbid,it )t∈T ∈ D, with D
bid,i
0 = 0, is the dividend process associated with holding a short
position of 1 share of security i = 1, . . . ,K.
(M2) P askt (ϕ,D
ask/bid,i), respectively P bidt (ϕ,D
ask/bid,i), denotes the ex-dividend prices of purchas-
ing, respectively selling, ϕ ∈ L∞+ (Ft) shares of cash flows D
ask,i or Dbid,i that are associated
with security i ∈ {1, . . . ,K} at time t ∈ T . We also assume that the pricing operators
P askt , P
bid
t : L
∞
+ (Ft)×D → L
2(Ft) are such that P
ask
t (0, ·) = P
bid
t (0, ·) = 0, t ∈ T .
(M3) The dividend process associated with holding 1 unit of the banking account is given by
processes D0 = (0, . . . , 0, 1) ∈ D. Moreover, ϕ ∈ L∞+ (Ft) units of the banking account are
purchased/sold at time t for price P askt (ϕ,D
0) = P bidt (ϕ,D
0) = ϕ · 1 = ϕ. In particular,
P askt (1,D
0) = P bidt (1,D
0) = 1.3
?? Let M be the set of all dividend processes in this market, i.e. M = {D0,Dask/bid,i, i =
1, . . . ,K}. We will use the notation (M, P ask, P bid) to denote our market model.
The market model (M, P ask, P bid) such that Dask,i = Dbid,i and P askt (ϕ,D
i) = P bidt (ϕ,D
i), for
any i = 1, . . . ,K, is called frictionless market model.
3This is consistent with our convention that all prices are discounted by the banking account, so that the price of
one unit of the banking account is 1 at any time t ∈ T .
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Remark 4.1. In accordance with our framework, it is generally assumed that Dask,i 6= Dbid,i and
P askt (ϕ,D
i) 6= P bidt (ϕ,D
i). We also remark that in this paper we do not postulate that the prices
P askt (ϕ,D) and P
bid
t (ϕ,D) are homogeneous (of degree one) in ϕ. In other words, we acknowledge
the fact that in practice the unit price of a security typically depends on the size of the position
in the security (cf. Example 4.4 below). This is due, for the most part, to market liquidity
considerations. As we shall see later, the bid/ask prices generated by our acceptability method are
not necessarily homogeneous.
We now illustrate the processes introduced above in the context of dividend paying stock and
Credit Default Swap (CDS) contract.
Example 4.2. Denote by ST the fundamental value associated to 1 share of a dividend paying
stock after dividend payment at time T . The dividend paid by 1 share of the stock at each time
node t = 1, . . . , T , is denoted by Dt, regardless of what position the investor is in. Therefore, the
dividend process associated with 1 share of the stock is
Dask = Dbid = {0,D1, . . . ,DT−1,DT + ST }.
In this case, the ex-dividend ask and bid price process P ask and P bid are the market quoted prices
for selling, respectively buying stock S; see also Example 4.4.
Example 4.3. A CDS contract is an agreement between the protection buyer and the protection
seller, in which the protection buyer pays a regular fixed premium up to occurrence of a pre-specified
credit event, in return, the seller promises a compensation to the buyer. Typically, CDS contracts
are traded on over-the-counter markets in which dealers quote CDS spreads to investors. Consider
a CDS contract that is initiated at t = 0, expires at t = T with nominal value N , the protection
buyer pays a spread κask to the dealer at each time node in exchange for a compensation δ at
default time τ ; the protection seller receives a spread κbid from the dealer at each time node and
he needs to pay δ to the dealer at τ . Please note that κask, κbid and δ all depends on N , and such
dependence is not necessarily linear.
The dividend processes Dask and Dbid associated to buying and selling the CDS with specifica-
tions above, respectively, satisfy
t∑
s=0
Dasks := 1{τ≤t}δ − κ
ask
t∑
s=1
1{s<τ},
t∑
s=0
Dbidt := 1{τ≤t}δ − κ
bid
t∑
s=1
1{s<τ},
for t = 1, . . . , T . In this case, the ex-dividend ask and bid price process P ask and P bid specify the
mark-to-market values of the CDS. In general, P ask and P bid are also not positively homogeneous
with respect to N ; a property confirmed by practitioners.
We close this subsection by illustrating the inhomogeneity of prices in a order-driven market.
Example 4.4. In an order-driven market, orders to buy and sell are centralized in a limit order
book available to market participants and orders are executed against the best available offers in
the limit order book.
Table 1 is the limit order book of Apple Inc (AAPL) publicly traded stock. As we can see, there
are up to 200 shares available for purchase at a price of $116.61 per share. Hence, P ask(1) = 116.61,
and for 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 200, P ask(ϕ) = ϕP ask(1). Similarly, for 200 < ϕ ≤ 900, we have that P ask(ϕ) =
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200 · 116.61 + (ϕ − 200) · 336.62 > ϕP ask(1). Thus, the ask price P ask(·) is not homogenous in
number of shares traded. Moreover, it is easy to note that P ask(·) is a convex function. Similarly,
the function P bid(·) is not homogenous and it is concave.
4.2 Self-financing Trading Strategies and Arbitrage
Due to nonlinearity of the prices and presence of transaction costs, the classical definition of self-
financing trading strategy and arbitrage are not suitable for the market model proposed above. In
this section we define the notion of self-financing trading strategy by using the general concept that
a self-financing trading strategy is a trading strategy that does not allow injection or substraction
of money during trading periods. Similarly, the notion of arbitrage is build on the idea that a
self-financing trading strategy can not yield a riskless profit. Moreover, following market practice,
we will allow that an investor can simultaneously have both long and short positions of the same
security at the same time, i.e. the long and short positions in the same security at the same time
are not necessarily netted out.
Definition 4.5. A trading strategy is a predictable process φ :=
{
(φ0t , φ
l,1
t , φ
s,1
t , . . . , φ
l,K
t , φ
s,K
t )
}T
t=1
,
where φ0t ∈ L
∞(Ft−1) is the number of units of banking account held from time t − 1 to t;
φl,it ∈ L
∞
+ (Ft−1) is the number of shares in long position of security i held from time t− 1 to t; and
φs,it ∈ L
∞
+ (Ft−1) is the number of shares in short position of security i held from time t − 1 to t.
Sometimes, we will use the notation φit = (φ
l,i
t , φ
s,i
t ), for i = 1, . . . ,K.
Definition 4.6. Let φ be a trading strategy.
(V1) The set-up cost process V˜ (φ) associated with φ is defined as
V˜t(φ) = φ
0
t+1 +
K∑
i=1
(
P askt (φ
l,i
t+1,D
ask,i)− P bidt (φ
s,i
t+1,D
bid,i)
)
, t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
(V2) The liquidation value process V (φ) associated with φ is defined as
Vt(φ) = φ
0
t +
K∑
i=1
(
P bidt (φ
l,i
t ,D
ask,i)− P askt (φ
s,i
t ,D
bid,i)
)
+
K∑
i=1
(
φl,it D
ask,i
t − φ
s,i
t D
bid,i
t
)
, t = 1, . . . , T.
Bid Price Bid Size Ask Price Ask Size
116.59 400 116.61 200
116.58 400 116.62 700
116.57 800 116.63 543
116.56 500 116.64 643
116.55 543 116.65 343
Table 1: Order Book of AAPL (Yahoo Finance 10:46AM EST 12/04/2014)
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For each t ∈ T , an investor could have both long and short positions of a security at the same
time. The process V˜ (φ) represents the cost of setting up the portfolio φ, and Vt(φ) is interpreted
as the liquidation value of the portfolio at time t (before any time t transactions), including any
dividends acquired from time t− 1 to time t. In classical frictionless market, the liquidation value
of a portfolio is the same as the set-up cost. However in our case, generally speaking, Vt(φ) 6= V˜t(φ)
due to transaction costs and non-homogeneity of P ask and P bid.
Definition 4.7. A trading strategy φ is self-financing if
∆φ0t+1 +
K∑
i=1
(
1
∆φl,it+1≥0
P askt (∆φ
l,i
t+1,D
ask,i)− 1
∆φl,it+1<0
P bidt (−∆φ
l,i
t+1,D
ask,i) (4.1)
− 1
∆φs,it+1≥0
P bidt (∆φ
s,i
t+1,D
bid) + 1
∆φs,it+1<0
P askt (−∆φ
s,i
t+1,D
bid)
)
=
K∑
i=1
(φl,it D
ask,i
t − φ
s,i
t D
bid,i
t ). (4.2)
for t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
Definition 4.7 provides a natural interpretation of self-financing condition in market with fric-
tion. The cash flows that are being bought or sold should depend on the both positions before and
after re-balance at each time t. All the money that is used for getting to the new position is equal
to the dividends acquired from time t − 1 to time t. Therefore, no money flows in or out of the
portfolio.
Next, we will introduce the concept of arbitrage that is relevant for our theory.
Definition 4.8. An arbitrage opportunity at time t, t ∈ T , is a self-financing strategy, such that
VT (φ)− V˜t(φ) ≥ 0 and P(VT (φ)− V˜t(φ) > 0) > 0. We call a market arbitrage free at time t if there
exists no arbitrage opportunity in the model at time t.
In what follows, we will provide two other characterizations of arbitrage opportunities, which
are useful in our paper. Towards this end, we first define the following sets,
S(t) = S(t, P ask, P bid) :=
{
{φ : φ is self-financing, V˜0(φ) = 0}, t = 0,
{φ : φ is self-financing, φs = 0 for all s ≤ t}, t = 1, . . . , T.
Note that for φ ∈ S(t), we have φt = 0. Due to our assumption that P
bid
t (0, ·) = P
ask
t (0, ·) = 0,
we have that V˜t(φ) = Vt(φ) = 0. Next, we introduce the set of cash flows generated by strategies
in S(t):
H0(t) =
{(
0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
t
,∆Vt+1(φ), . . . ,∆VT (φ)
)
: φ ∈ S(t)
}
, t ∈ T . (4.3)
Since P askt , P
bid
t : L
∞
+ (Ft) × D → D, we have that V˜t(φ), Vt(φ) ∈ L
2(Ft) for any self-financing
trading strategy φ, and therefore H0(t) ⊂ D.
Next result gives two characterization of arbitrage.
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Proposition 4.9. The following statements are equivalent:
(1) There exists an arbitrage opportunity at time t.
(2) There exists a strategy ψ ∈ S(t), such that VT (ψ) ≥ 0 and P(VT (ψ) > 0) > 0.
(3) There exists a cash flow (0, . . . , 0,Ht+1, . . . ,HT ) ∈ H
0(t), such that
∑T
s=t+1Hs ≥ 0 and
P(
∑T
s=t+1Hs > 0) > 0.
Proof. For a fixed t ∈ T , we will show that (1) is equivalent to (2), and (2) is equivalent to (3).
(2) ⇒ (1) Assume that there exists ψ ∈ S(t) such that VT (ψ) ≥ 0 and P(VT (ψ) > 0) > 0. Since
ψ ∈ S(t), then V˜t(ψ) = 0, and (2) follows immediately.
(1)⇒ (2) Assume that φ is gives an arbitrage opportunity at time t. We define a trading strategy
ψ as follows
ψ0u = ψ
l,i
u = ψ
s,i
u = 0, u = 0, . . . , t, i = 0, . . . ,K,
ψ0u = φ
0
u − V˜t(φ), u = t+ 1, . . . , T,
ψl/s,iu = φ
l/s,i
u , u = t+ 1, . . . , T, i = 1, . . . ,K.
It is straightforward to see that V˜0(ψ) = 0, and ψu = 0 for u ≤ t. To show that ψ is self-financing,
first notice that
∆ψ0t+1 +
K∑
i=1
(
1
∆ψl,it+1≥0
P askt (∆ψ
l,i
t+1,D
ask,i)− 1
∆ψl,it+1<0
P bidt (−∆ψ
l,i
t+1,D
ask,i)
− 1
∆ψs,it+1≥0
P bidt (∆ψ
s,i
t+1,D
bid,i) + 1
∆ψs,it+1<0
P askt (−∆ψ
s,i
t+1,D
bid,i)
)
=φ0t+1 − V˜t(φ) +
K∑
i=1
(
P askt (φ
l,i
t+1,D
ask,i)− P bidt (φ
s,i
t+1,D
bid,i)
)
=V˜t(φ)− V˜t(φ) = 0
=
K∑
i=1
(ψl,it D
ask,i
t − ψ
i,s
t D
bid,i
t ). (4.4)
Since ∆ψu = ∆φu for any u ≥ t+ 1, and φ is a self-financing trading strategy, then also in view of
(4.4), we conclude that ψ is a self-financing strategy. Hence, ψ ∈ S(t), and VT (ψ) = VT (φ)− Vt(φ)
which implies that VT (ψ) ≥ 0, P(VT (ψ) > 0) > 0.
(2) ⇒ (3) Assume that ψ ∈ S(t), and VT (ψ) ≥ 0, P(VT (ψ) > 0) > 0. Then, we define the process
H as follows
Hs :=
{
0, s = 0, . . . , t,
∆Vs(ψ), s = t+ 1, . . . , T.
Then H ∈ H0(t),
∑T
s=t+1Hs =
∑T
s=0∆Vs(ψ) = VT (ψ) ≥ 0, and thus P(
∑T
s=t+1Hs > 0) =
P(VT (ψ) > 0) > 0.
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(3) ⇒ (2) Now, suppose that there exists a cash flow
(
0, . . . , 0, Ĥt+1, . . . , ĤT
)
∈ H0(t) such that∑T
s=t+1 Ĥs ≥ 0 and P(
∑T
s=t+1 Ĥs > 0) > 0. Then, by definition of H
0(t) there exists a ψ ∈ S(t)
such that Vt(ψ) = 0, ∆Vs(ψ) = Ĥs, s ∈ {t+ 1, . . . , T} and
VT (ψ) =
T∑
s=0
∆Vs(ψ) =
T∑
s=t+1
Ĥs ≥ 0.
Moreover, P(VT (ψ) > 0) = P(
∑T
s=t+1 Ĥs > 0) > 0. Thus, (3) holds true.
This concludes the proof.
With the results from Proposition 4.9 at hand, we say that the no-arbitrage condition (NA)
for H0(t) holds if (3) does not hold, and throughout this section, we will characterize arbitrage
opportunities by properties (2) or (3) as in Proposition 4.9.
Clearly, since S(t+1) ⊂ S(t), absence of arbitrage at time t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1} implies absence
of arbitrage at any future times s, s = t+ 1, . . . , T − 1. In particular, if a market is arbitrage free
at time 0, then such market is arbitrage free at any time t ∈ T . Hence, to show that there is no
arbitrage opportunity in the market, it is enough to show no arbitrage at time 0. Accordingly, we
have the following definition.
Definition 4.10. A market is called arbitrage free if there exists no arbitrage opportunity in the
model at time 0.
It is important to observe though, that, contrary to the classical frictionless market model,
absence of arbitrage at time t = 1, . . . , T −1, in models considered here does not (in general) imply
absence of arbitrage at time s, where s < t. This will be illustrated in the following example.
Example 4.11. Let T = 2 ,Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4}, and we consider a market with one banking
account and one security paying no dividend. Assume that the pricing operator is homogeneous
with respect to the number shares traded, and the price process of the security is given in Table 2.
P ask(ω1)/P
bid(ω1) P
ask(ω2)/P
bid(ω2) P
ask(ω3)/P
bid(ω3) P
ask(ω4)/P
bid(ω4)
T = 0 10/10 10/10 10/10 10/10
T = 1 12/11 12/11 11/10 11/10
T = 2 13/12 11/10 12/11 10/9
Table 2: Stock Price Dynamics, Example 4.11.
Consider the trading strategy ψ1 = (−10, 1), ψ2(ω1, ω2) = (1, 0) and ψ2(ω3, ω4) = (0, 0). Thus,
ψ is a self-financing strategy such that V˜0 = 0, V1(ω1, ω2) = V2(ω1, ω2) = 1 and V1(ω3, ω4) =
V2(ω3, ω4) = 0. According to Definition 4.8, it is an arbitrage opportunity at time 0. However, it
is not hard to observe that for any ϕ ∈ S(1), ϕ could not be an arbitrage opportunity at time 1.
4.3 Pricing Operators
In this section we will introduce some pricing operators for cash flows D ∈ D through an acceptabil-
ity method and show some properties of such prices. Then, in the next section, we will show that a
market, in which the fundamental assets are priced according to our pricing operators, satisfies the
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properties postulated in (M2) and (M3), and this market is arbitrage free in the sense of Definition
4.8.
For any random variable a that is Ft-measurable, and process X = (Xt)t∈T , we will use the
following notation:
δt(a) = 1{t}a := {0, . . . , 0, a, 0, . . . , 0},
δ+t (X) = {0, . . . , 0,Xt+1, . . . ,XT }.
For any D ∈ D, δ+t (D) represents the the future cash flow, at time t ∈ T , of the dividend
stream D. We are going to evaluate this future dividend cash flow, in other words, to calculate the
ex-dividend prices of D, by using an acceptability based method.
Assume that an investor wants to buy ϕ shares of cash flow D ∈ D at time t ∈ T , where ϕ ∈ Ft,
ϕ ≥ 0, then the market as the counterparty will charge P askt (ϕ,D) at time t and deliver δ
+
t (D) to the
buyer. Thus, the corresponding cash flow for the market is {0, . . . , 0, P askt (ϕ,D),−ϕDt+1, . . . ,−ϕDT }.
To decide the proper P askt (ϕ,D), the market will choose the smallest P
ask,D
t (ϕ) such that
{0, . . . , 0, P askt (ϕ,D),−ϕDt+1, . . . ,−ϕDT } is acceptable with respect to some acceptability index
αg at some level γ. Similarly, the market will choose the largest P bidt (ϕ,D) such that the cash flow
{0, . . . , 0,−P bidt (ϕ,D), ϕDt+1, . . . , ϕDT } is acceptable at level γ, when an investor is selling ϕ ≥ 0
shares of D ∈ D at time t ∈ T .
Throughout this section, we will always consider the family of drivers g = (gx)x>0 satisfy
Assumption G. We proceed by defining the acceptability ask price ag,γt and the acceptability bid
price bg,γt .
Definition 4.12. Let g = (gx)x>0 be a family of drivers. The acceptability ask price of ϕ ∈ L
∞
+ (Ft)
shares of the cash flow D ∈ D, at level γ, at time t ∈ T is defined as
ag,γt (ϕ,D) = ess inf{a ∈ Ft : α
g
t (δt(a)− δ
+
t (ϕD)) ≥ γ}; (4.5)
and the acceptability bid price of ϕ ∈ L∞+ (Ft) shares of D ∈ D, at level γ, at time t ∈ T is defined
as
bg,γt (ϕ,D) = ess sup{b ∈ Ft : α
g
t (δ
+
t (ϕD)− δt(b)) ≥ γ}. (4.6)
For ϕ ∈ L∞+ (Ft) and D ∈ D, a
g,γ
t (ϕ,D) and b
g,γ
t (ϕ,D) are the ex-dividend prices at time t,
therefore, they are independent of D0, . . . ,Dt.
Remark 4.13. Note that in Definition 4.12, ϕ is a Ft-measurable random variable, thus by applying
the pricing operators ag,γt and b
g,γ
t to cash flows generated by any trading strategy φ, we will get
well-defined set-up cost process V˜t(φ) and liquidation value process Vt(φ). Also by observing the
fact that ag,γt (ϕ,D) = a
g,γ
t (1, ϕD) and b
g,γ
t (ϕ,D) = b
g,γ
t (1, ϕD), we will prove most results for
ag,γt (1,D) and b
g,γ
t (1,D). Then such results are also true for a
g,γ
t (ϕ,D) and b
g,γ
t (ϕ,D).
Remark 4.14. We call ag,γt (1,D) the time t acceptability ask price of D at level γ, and b
g,γ
t (1,D)
the time t acceptability bid price of D at level γ. For simplicity, we will use the notation ag,γt (D) =
ag,γt (1,D) and b
g,γ
t (D) = b
g,γ
t (1,D).
Remark 4.15. We observe that in Definition 4.12 ϕ is non-negative. This is consistent with the
term “buy/sell ϕ shares of some security” which is used in practice.
Next, we provide some important properties of acceptability ask and bid prices.
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Theorem 4.16. The acceptability ask and bid prices of D ∈ D, at level γ > 0, at time t ∈ T ,
satisfy the following properties:
P1. Representation:
ag,γt (D) = Egγ
[ T∑
s=t+1
Ds
∣∣∣Ft],
bg,γt (D) = −Egγ
[
−
T∑
s=t+1
Ds
∣∣∣Ft].
P2. No Arbitrage:
ag,γt (D) ≥ b
g,γ
t (D).
P3. Convexity and Concavity:
ag,γt (λD
1 + (1− λ)D2) ≤ λag,γt (D
1) + (1− λ)ag,γt (D
2),
bg,γt (λD
1 + (1− λ)D2) ≥ λbg,γt (D
1) + (1− λ)bg,γt (D
2),
for D1,D2 ∈ D, λ ∈ L∞+ (Ft), 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1.
P4. Market Impact:
ag,γt (λϕ,D) ≤ λa
g,γ
t (ϕ,D), b
g,γ
t (λϕ,D) ≥ λb
g,γ
t (ϕ,D), λ, ϕ ∈ L
∞
+ (Ft), 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1;
ag,γt (λϕ,D) ≥ λa
g,γ
t (ϕ,D), b
g,γ
t (λϕ,D) ≤ λb
g,γ
t (ϕ,D), λ, ϕ ∈ L
∞
+ (Ft), λ ≥ 1.
P5. Time Consistency:
ag,γt (D) = a
g,γ
t (δt+1(Dt+1 + a
g,γ
t+1(D))),
bg,γt (D) = b
g,γ
t (δt+1(Dt+1 + b
g,γ
t+1(D))).
P6. Linearity (if the drivers are linear): If gγ(t, z) = x(t)z, t ∈ T . Then, there exists a probability
measure Q ∼ P such that
ag,γt (ϕ,D) = b
g,γ
t (ϕ,D) = ϕEQ
[ T∑
s=t+1
Ds|Ft
]
,
for ϕ ∈ L∞+ (Ft).
Proof. We will prove the results only for acceptability ask prices; the case of acceptability bid prices
is treated similarly.
P1. Due to G3 of Assumption G, by similar arguments as in Theorem 3.10, we get that αgt (X) ≥ γ
for γ > 0 is equivalent to the fact that ρ
gγ
t (X) ≤ 0. Also, in view of the definition of acceptability
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ask price, we have
ag,γt (D) = ess inf{a ∈ Ft : α
g
t (δt(a)− δ
+
t (D)) ≥ γ}
= ess inf
{
a ∈ Ft : Egγ
[
− a+
T∑
s=t+1
Ds
∣∣∣Ft] ≤ 0
}
= ess inf
{
a ∈ Ft : a ≥ Egγ
[ T∑
s=t+1
Ds
∣∣∣Ft]
}
= Egγ
[ T∑
s=t+1
Ds
∣∣∣Ft].
P2. By convexity of g-expectation, we have that
1
2
Egγ
[ T∑
s=t+1
Ds
∣∣∣Ft]+ 1
2
Egγ
[
−
T∑
s=t+1
Ds
∣∣∣Ft] ≥ Egγ[12(
T∑
s=t+1
Ds −
T∑
s=t+1
Ds
)∣∣∣Ft] = 0.
Hence, due to property P1, we get ag,γt (D) ≥ b
g,γ
t (D).
P3. Property P3 follows from convexity of gγ(t, ·), convexity of the g-expectation, and P1.
P4. By taking D1 = D, and D2 = 0, for λ, ϕ ∈ L∞(Ft), 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, we have a
g,γ
t (λϕD) ≤
λag,γt (ϕD). Since a
g,γ
t (λϕD) = a
g,γ
t (λϕ,D) and a
g,γ
t (ϕD) = a
g,γ
t (ϕ,D), we immediately get that
ag,γt (λϕ,D) ≤ λa
g,γ
t (ϕ,D).
For λ ∈ L∞(Ft), λ ≥ 1, D
′′ ∈ D, we have that ag,γt (ϕ,
D′′
λ ) = a
g,γ
t (
ϕ
λ ,D
′′) ≤ 1λa
g,γ
t (ϕ,D
′′).
P5. According to P1 and Proposition 2.14 (iii), we have that
ag,γt (δt+1(Dt+1 + a
g,γ
t+1(D))) = Egγ
[
Dt+1 + Egγ
[ T∑
s=t+2
Ds
∣∣∣Ft+1]∣∣∣Ft]
= Egγ
[
Egγ
[ T∑
s=t+1
Ds
∣∣∣Ft+1]∣∣∣Ft] = Egγ[ T∑
s=t+1
Ds
∣∣∣Ft]
= ag,γt (D).
P6. By Proposition 2.15, there exists a probability measure Q ∼ P, such that Egγ [X|Ft] = EQ[X|Ft]
for all X ∈ L2(FT ). Then, using P1, for ϕ ∈ Ft, we obtain
ag,γt (ϕ,D) = a
g,γ
t (1, ϕD) = Egγ [ϕ
T∑
s=t+1
Ds|Ft] = EQ[ϕ
T∑
s=t+1
Ds|Ft] = ϕEQ[
T∑
s=t+1
Ds|Ft].
Hence, ag,γt (ϕ,D) = ϕα
g,γ
t (1,D).
This concludes the proof.
Remark 4.17. By Property P4 in Theorem 4.16.P4 we have that ag,γt (λ,D) ≥ λa
g,γ
t (D), for any
λ ≥ 1. This indicates that if an investor is buying a cashflow, the price moves up against the
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buyer (the effect of market impact). Similar argument follows for the bid price. Such property of
acceptability ask and bid prices is consistent with real market quotes, as it was shown for equity
markets in Example 4.4.
In case of classical risk-neutral pricing the discounted cumulative dividend prices of cashflows
are martingales under an equivalent martingale measure Q. In our pricing framework, a similar
‘martingale property’ also holds true as shown in the next result. For a given dividend stream
D ∈ D, we define the acceptability cumulative dividend prices at time t as follows
acld,g,γt (D) :=
t∑
s=0
Ds + a
g,γ
t (D),
bcld,g,γt (D) :=
t∑
s=0
Ds + b
g,γ
t (D).
As an immediate consequence of Theorem 4.16.P5, we obtain.
Corollary 4.18. The acceptability ask and bid cumulative dividend prices of a cash flow D, at level
γ > 0 satisfy
acld,g,γt (D) = a
g,γ
t (δt+1(a
cld,g,γ
t+1 (D))),
bcld,g,γt (D) = b
g,γ
t (δt+1(b
cld,g,γ
t+1 (D))).
Remark 4.19. This proposition is a counterpart of time consistency in case of linear pricing. The
time t cumulative dividend price of D is equal to evaluating time t+ 1 cumulative dividend price
at time t. We call such property the time consistency of acceptability ask/bid prices.
So far, we have showed that if the market picks the same level γ > 0 for the given family of
drivers g on both buying and selling side, then we have some nice properties of the ask and bid
prices. On the other hand, in general, market participants will choose different acceptability levels
or even acceptability indices (different family of drivers) for buying and/or selling. In the rest of
this section, we will provide some results regarding this possibilities.
Proposition 4.20. Let g1 and g2 be two families of drivers. Then, ag
1,γ1
t (D) ≥ b
g2,γ2
t (D), for any
D ∈ D, t ∈ T , γ1, γ2 > 0.
Proof. We will prove the statement recursively, backward in time component.
Let At := {ω ∈ Ω : g
1
γ1(ω, t, z) ≥ g
2
γ2(ω, t, z), z ∈ R}, t ∈ T \ {0}. since the drivers are
predictable, both At and A
c
t are Ft−1 measurable, .
By definition of AT , we have that 1AT g
1
γ1(T, z) ≥ 1AT g
2
γ2(T, z) and 1AcT g
1
γ1(T, z) ≤ 1AcT g
2
γ2(T, z),
for all z ∈ R. Hence, in view of Theorem 2.6 and Theorem 4.16, we get that
1AT Eg1γ1
[DT |FT−1] ≥ 1AT Eg2γ2
[DT |FT−1] ≥ −1AT Eg2γ2
[−DT |FT−1],
1Ac
T
Eg1γ1
[DT |FT−1] ≥ −1Ac
T
Eg1γ1
[−DT |FT−1] ≥ −1Ac
T
Eg2γ2
[−DT |FT−1].
Therefore, 1AT a
g1,γ1
T−1 (D) ≥ 1AT b
g2,γ2
T−1 (D) and 1AcT a
g1,γ1
T−1 (D) ≥ 1AcT b
g2,γ2
T−1 (D), and thus the statement
holds true for t = T .
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Note that by definition of acceptability cumulative dividend prices, we have that
ag
1,γ1
T−2 (D) +
T−2∑
s=1
Ds = a
cld,g1,γ1
T−2 (D),
bg
2,γ2
T−2 (D) +
T−2∑
s=1
Ds = b
cld,g2,γ2
T−2 (D).
In view of Proposition 4.18, we also have that that
acld,g
1,γ1
T−2 (D) = Eg1γ1
[ag
1,γ1
T−1 (D) +
T−1∑
s=1
Ds|FT−2] = Eg1γ1
[ag
1,γ1
T−1 (D) +DT−1|FT−2] +
T−2∑
s=1
Ds,
bcld,g
2,γ2
T−2 (D) = −Eg2γ2
[−bg
2,γ2
T−1 (D)−
T−1∑
s=1
Ds|FT−2] = −Eg2γ2
[−bg
2,γ2
T−1 (D)−DT−1|FT−2] +
T−2∑
s=1
Ds.
Thus, ag
1,γ1
T−2 (D) = Eg1γ1
[ag
1,γ1
T−1 (D) + DT−1|FT−2] and b
g2,γ2
T−2 (D) = Eg2γ2
[bg
2,γ2
T−1 (D) + DT−1|FT−2]. In
view of above, we have ag
1,γ1
T−1 (D) +DT−1 ≥ b
g2,γ2
T−1 (D) + DT−1. Consequently, applying again the
comparison Theorem 2.6 and Theorem 4.16, we deduce
1AT−1Eg1γ1
[ag
1,γ1
T−1 (D) +DT−1|FT−2] ≥ 1AT−1Eg2γ2
[bg
2,γ2
T−1 (D) +DT−1|FT−2]
≥ −1AT−1Eg2γ2
[−bg
2,γ2
T−1 (D)−DT−1|FT−2],
and
1Ac
T−1
Eg1γ1
[ag
1,γ1
T−1 (D) +DT−1|FT−2] ≥ −1AcT−1Eg1γ1
[−ag
1,γ1
T−1 (D)−DT−1|FT−2]
≥ −1Ac
T−1
Eg1γ1
[−bg
2,γ2
T−1 (D)−DT−1|FT−2].
Therefore, ag
1,γ1
T−2 (D) ≥ b
g2,γ2
T−2 (D). We continue this backward procedure for any finite number of
steps till t = 0.
The proof is complete.
Proposition 4.20 shows that regardless of what drivers and what level of acceptability one
chooses for buying and selling side, the ask price will be greater than the bid price. In particular,
when the same family of drivers g is chosen for both trading sides, then ag,γ1t (D) ≥ b
g,γ2
t (D), for
any D ∈ D, t ∈ T , γ1, γ2 > 0.
Next result shows that the bid-ask spread increases when acceptability level is increased.
Proposition 4.21. For any γ2 ≥ γ1 > 0, t ∈ T , and any D ∈ D,
ag,γ1t (D) ≤ a
g,γ2
t (D), b
g,γ1
t (D) ≥ b
g,γ2
t (D).
Proof. It is sufficient to note that
{a ∈ Ft : α
g
t (δt(a)− δ
+
t (D)) ≥ γ2} ⊆ {a ∈ Ft : α
g
t (δt(a)− δ
+
t (D)) ≥ γ1},
for any γ2 ≥ γ1. Using the definition of acceptability ask and bid prices, the result follows at once.
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Suppose that two counterparties A and B are looking to make a trade on a cashflow D at time
t, such as, A is willing to sell ϕ ∈ L∞+ (Ft) share of D, and B wants to buy ϕ share of D. Assume
that both parties are using acceptability pricing theory. Namely, party A will use the family of
drivers g1, and level γ1, to calculate his ask price, and party B will use g
2, and level γ2, to calculate
her bid price. Clearly the trade will happen only if B’s bid price meets A’s ask price. Note that
Proposition 4.20 guarantees only that ag
1,γ1
t (ϕ,D) ≥ b
g2,γ2
t (ϕ,D), and hence, it is important to
investigate under which conditions ag
1,γ1
t (ϕ,D) = b
g2,γ2
t (ϕ,D). Not to our surprise, this question
has a close connection to linear pricing theory. As shown in the next result, in order for bid and
ask prices to coincide, the drivers (and hence the prices) have to be locally linear.
Proposition 4.22. Let A ∈ Ft, g
1 and g2 be two families of drivers, γ1, γ2 > 0. Then,
1Aa
g1,γ1
t (ϕ,D) = 1Ab
g2,γ2
t (ϕ,D)
if and only if there exists a driver g˜(t, z) such that g˜(t, ·) is linear, and
1AEg1γ1
[λ
T∑
s=t+1
Ds|Ft] = 1AEg˜[λ
T∑
s=t+1
Ds|Ft];
1AEg2γ2
[−λ
T∑
s=t+1
Ds|Ft] = 1AEg˜[−λ
T∑
s=t+1
Ds|Ft], (4.7)
for any 0 ≤ λ ≤ ϕ.
Proof. (⇐=) If there exists a driver g˜(t, z) such that g˜ is linear in z, and 1AEg1γ1
[λ
∑T
s=t+1Ds|Ft] =
1AEg˜[λ
∑T
s=t+1Ds|Ft], 1AEg2γ2
[−λ
∑T
s=t+1Ds|Ft] = 1AEg˜[−λ
∑T
s=t+1Ds|Ft] for 0 ≤ λ ≤ ϕ, then,
by takeing λ = ϕ, we have
1Aa
g1,γ1
t (ϕ,D) = 1AEg1γ1
[
ϕ
T∑
s=t+1
Ds
∣∣∣Ft] = 1AEg˜[ϕ T∑
s=t+1
Ds
∣∣∣Ft];
1Ab
g2,γ2
t (ϕ,D) = −1AEg2γ2
[
− ϕ
T∑
s=t+1
Ds
∣∣∣Ft] = 1AEg˜[ϕ T∑
s=t+1
Ds
∣∣∣Ft],
and hence, 1Aa
g1,γ1
t (ϕ,D) = 1Ab
g2,γ2
t (ϕ,D).
(=⇒) Assume that 1Aa
g1,γ1
t (ϕ,D) = 1Ab
g2,γ2
t (ϕ,D). Then, for 0 ≤ λ ≤ ϕ, there exists 0 ≤ λ
′ ≤ 1
such that λ = λ′ϕ. By Theorem 4.16.P4, we get
1Aa
g1,γ1
t (λ,D) ≤ 1Aλ
′ag
1,γ1
t (ϕ,D) = 1Aλ
′bg
2,γ2
t (ϕ,D) ≤ 1Ab
g2,γ2
t (λ,D),
however, in view of Proposition 4.20, we have that 1Aa
g1,γ1
t (λ,D) ≥ 1Ab
g2,γ2
t (λ,D). Therefore,
1Aa
g1,γ1
t (λ,D) = 1Aλ
′ag
1,γ1
t (ϕ,D) = 1Aλ
′bg
2,γ2
t (ϕ,D) = 1Ab
g2,γ2
t (λ,D), (4.8)
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Let (Eg1γ1
[1Aϕ
∑T
u=t+1Du|Fs], Z˜s, M˜s), t ≤ s ≤ T be the solution of BS∆E corresponding to driver
gγ and terminal condition 1Aϕ
∑T
s=t+1Ds. Let us define x
t
s for t+ 1 ≤ s ≤ T as
xs =
 g
1
γ1
(s,Z˜s)
Z˜s
if Z˜s 6= 0
0 if Z˜s = 0.
(4.9)
Next, we define g˜(s, z) = xsz for t+ 1 ≤ s ≤ T , and z ∈ R. We will show that g˜ is the desired
driver.
First, let us show that g˜ satisfies Assumption A. According to Proposition A.3, xs defined in
(4.9) is Fs−1-measurable, and thus g˜(s, z) is Fs−1-measurable for any z ∈ R, and so it satisfies
A1. Since g1γ1 satisfies assumption A2, then |xs| =
|g1γ1(s,Z˜s)|
|Z˜s|
≤ c1γ1(s) on the set {Z˜s 6= 0}, where
c1γ1(s) is the Lipschitz coefficient of g
1
γ1 , for s ∈ {t+ 1, . . . , T}. Of course, |xs| = 0 ≤ c
1
γ1(s) on the
complement of {Z˜s 6= 0}, for s ∈ {t + 1, . . . , T}. Thus, g˜ satisfies A2. Clearly, g˜ satisfies A3, and
thus it satisfies Assumption A.
Next, we will show that the identities (4.7) are fulfilled. By the construction of g˜, we have that
1AEg1γ1
[ϕ
∑T
s=t+1Ds|Ft] = 1AEg˜[ϕ
∑T
s=t+1Ds|Ft], and thus, for 0 ≤ λ ≤ ϕ, with λ = λ
′ϕ, we get
1AEg˜
[
λ
T∑
s=t+1
Ds
∣∣∣Ft] = 1Aλ′Eg˜[ϕ T∑
s=t+1
Ds
∣∣∣Ft] = 1Aλ′Eg1γ1[ϕ T∑
s=t+1
Ds
∣∣∣Ft]
= 1AEg1γ1
[
λ
T∑
s=t+1
Ds
∣∣∣Ft],
where the last equality holds because of (4.8). Second identity from (4.7) is proved similarly.
This concludes the proof.
Remark 4.23. Proposition 4.22 implies that ag
1,γ1
t (ϕ,D) = b
g2,γ2
t (ϕ,D) if and only if a
g1,γ1
t (λ,D) =
bg
2,γ2
t (λ,D), for any 0 ≤ λ ≤ ϕ. In other words, if two counterparties agree on the prices for ϕ
shares, then they will also agree on prices for any smaller (positive) number of shares λϕ.
To conclude this section, we show that if αg
1,γ1
t (D) = b
g2,γ2
t (D) for all D ∈ D and t ∈ T , then
g1γ1 and g
2
γ2 have to be equal and linear. This is one reason why the results in Proposition 4.22 hold
true only locally.
Proposition 4.24. Let g1 and g2 be two families of drivers, and γ1, γ2 > 0.
(i) Assume that ag
1,γ1
t (D) = b
g2,γ2
t (D) for any D ∈ D, and for a fixed t ∈ T . Then, Eg1γ1
[
·
|Ft]=Eg2γ2
[
· |Ft]. Moreover, in this case the functional Eg1γ1
[
· |Ft] is linear.
(ii) Assume that ag
1,γ1
t (D) = b
g2,γ2
t (D) for any D ∈ D, and any t ∈ T . Then, there exists a driver
g˜(t, z) such that g˜(t, ·) is linear, and g1γ1(t, z) = g
2
γ2(t, z) = g˜(t, z) for any t ∈ T , z ∈ R.
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Proof. Due to the assumption and the representations of bid/ask prices, we have
Eg1γ1
[ T∑
s=t+1
Ds
∣∣∣Ft] = −Eg2γ2[− T∑
s=t+1
Ds
∣∣∣Ft], D ∈ D. (4.10)
Clearly, (4.10) is also true for −D and therefore
Eg2γ2
[ T∑
s=t+1
Ds
∣∣∣Ft] = −Eg1γ1[− T∑
s=t+1
Ds
∣∣∣Ft] ≤ Eg1γ1[ T∑
s=t+1
Ds
∣∣∣Ft] = −Eg2γ2[− T∑
s=t+1
Ds
∣∣∣Ft].
Since −Eg2γ2
[−
∑T
s=t+1Ds|Ft] ≤ Eg2γ2
[
∑T
s=t+1Ds|Ft], then
Eg2γ2
[ T∑
s=t+1
Ds
∣∣∣Ft] = −Eg1γ1[− T∑
s=t+1
Ds
∣∣∣Ft] = Eg1γ1[ T∑
s=t+1
Ds
∣∣∣Ft] = −Eg2γ2[− T∑
s=t+1
Ds
∣∣∣Ft] (4.11)
for any D ∈ D.
In view of (4.11), we have that ag
i,γi
t (ϕ,D) = a
gi,γi
t (1, ϕD) = b
gi,γi
t (1, ϕD) = b
gi,γi
t (ϕ,D),
i = 1, 2, and thus, by Proposition 4.22, we obtain that
Egiγi
[
ϕ
T∑
s=t+1
Ds
∣∣∣Ft] = ϕEgiγi [ T∑
s=t+1
Ds
∣∣∣Ft], i = 1, 2, (4.12)
for any ϕ ∈ L∞+ (Ft), D ∈ D. Moreover, by (4.11) again, equation (4.12) is also true for ϕ ∈ L
∞
− (Ft).
Hence, (4.12) is true for any ϕ ∈ L∞(Ft).
To proceed, let D1,D2 ∈ D, a, b ∈ L∞(Ft). Then by convexity of g-expectation and (4.12), we
have that
Egiγi
[
a
T∑
s=t+1
D1s + b
T∑
s=t+1
D2s
∣∣∣Ft] ≤ 1
2
Egiγi
[
2a
T∑
s=t+1
D1s
∣∣∣Ft]+ 1
2
Egiγi
[
2b
T∑
s=t+1
D2s
∣∣∣Ft]
= aEgiγi
[ T∑
s=t+1
D1s
∣∣∣Ft]+ bEgiγi[ T∑
s=t+1
D2s
∣∣∣Ft].
Due to (4.11), it is also true that
Egiγi
[
a
T∑
s=t+1
D1s + b
T∑
s=t+1
D2s
∣∣∣Ft] ≥ aEgiγi[ T∑
s=t+1
D1s
∣∣∣Ft]+ bEgiγi[ T∑
s=t+1
D2s
∣∣∣Ft],
and consequently, in view of the above, we deduce that
Egiγi
[
a
T∑
s=t+1
D1s + b
T∑
s=t+1
D2s
∣∣∣Ft] = aEgiγi[ T∑
s=t+1
D1s
∣∣∣Ft]+ bEgiγi[ T∑
s=t+1
D2s
∣∣∣Ft]. (4.13)
Thus, (4.11), (4.12) and (4.13) imply that Eg1γ1
[ · |Ft] = Eg2γ2
[ · |Ft], and they are linear.
If ag
1,γ1
t (D) = b
g2,γ2
t (D) for any D ∈ D, t ∈ T , then Eg1γ1
[ · |Ft] = Eg2γ2
[ · |Ft] and they are
linear for any t ∈ T . By Proposition 2.16, there exists a linear driver g˜(t, z) such that g1γ1(t, z) =
g2γ2(t, z) = g˜(t, z), t ∈ T , z ∈ R.
This concludes the proof.
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4.4 Market Models
In this section, we will consider some market models that follow the set-up introduced in Section 4.1.
Recall that a market is denoted by a triple (M, P ask, P bid), where M is the subspace of D that
consists of processesDask/bid,i, i = 1, . . . ,K, as in (M1), andD0 = (0, . . . , 0, 1) which is the dividend
process of the banking account. The functionals P ask and P bid allow to compute the ex-dividend
prices of the cashflow D˜ ∈ M. We will define P ask and P bid by using pricing operators introduced
in Section 4.3.
4.4.1 Ask and Bid Prices Computed at the Same Acceptability Level
Let g be a family of drivers that satisfies Assumption G, and let γ > 0. We consider the market
model (M, ag,γ , bg,γ). Namely, we put
P askt (ϕ, D˜) = a
g,γ
t (ϕ, D˜), P
bid
t (ϕ, D˜) = b
g,γ
t (ϕ, D˜),
for any cashflow D˜ ∈M, and ϕ ∈ L∞+ (Ft).
Since ag,γ , bg,γ : L∞+ (Ft) × D → L
2(Ft), for any t ∈ T , then such market is well-defined.
Moreover, due to Theorem 4.16, we also have the following representation
P askt (ϕ, D˜) = Egγ
[
ϕ
T∑
s=t+1
D˜s
∣∣∣Ft],
P bidt (ϕ, D˜) = −Egγ
[
− ϕ
T∑
s=t+1
D˜s
∣∣∣Ft].
According to Proposition 2.14, we have that P askt (0, D˜) = Egγ [0|Ft] = 0, and P
bid
t (0, D˜) =
−Egγ [0|Ft] = 0. Hence, the market satisfies assumption (M2). In particular, for D
0 = (0, . . . , 0, 1),
it is clear that
P askt (ϕ,D
0) = ag,γt (ϕ,D
0) = Egγ [ϕ|Ft] = ϕ,
P bidt (ϕ,D
0) = bg,γt (ϕ,D
0) = −Egγ [−ϕ|Ft] = ϕ,
for any ϕ ∈ L∞+ (Ft), which implies that the market satisfies (M3).
Next, we will show that our market satisfies the following important properties, proved over the
course of two theorems:
(M4) The market is arbitrage-free.
(M5) For any D˜ ∈ M, λ ∈ L∞(Ft), and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, t ∈ T ,
P askt (λϕ
1 + (1− λ)ϕ2, D˜) ≤ λP askt (ϕ
1, D˜) + (1− λ)P askt (ϕ
2, D˜),
P bidt (λϕ
1 + (1− λ)ϕ2, D˜) ≥ λP bidt (ϕ
1, D˜) + (1− λ)P bidt (ϕ
2, D˜).
(M6) For any D˜ ∈ M, ϕ1, λ ∈ L∞+ (Ft), ϕ
2 ∈ L∞− (Ft), 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, i = 1, . . . ,K, and t ∈ T ,
λP askt (ϕ
1, D˜)− (1− λ)P bidt (−ϕ
2, D˜) ≥ 1ϑ≥0P
ask
t (ϑ, D˜)− 1ϑ<0P
bid
t (−ϑ, D˜),
where ϑ = λϕ1 + (1− λ)ϕ2.
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Properties (M5) and (M6) imply that diversification in the trading is favored. If an investor nets
his purchasing and selling in a convex way, then the cost of trading will be reduced.
Now we proceed by showing that such market is arbitrage free.
Theorem 4.25. The market model (M, ag,γ , bg,γ), γ > 0, is arbitrage free.
Proof. Assume, the market admits an arbitrage, so that, according to Proposition 4.9, there is a
trading strategy φ ∈ S(0, γ) := S(0, ag,γ , bg,γ), such that VT (φ) ≥ 0 and P(VT (φ) > 0) > 0. We will
show that this leads to a contradiction.
Note that
VT (φ) =φ
0
T +
K∑
i=1
(
φl,iT D
ask,i
T − φ
s,i
T D
bid,i
T
)
=φ01 +
T∑
s=2
∆φ0s +
K∑
i=1
(
φl,iT D
ask,i
T − φ
s,i
T D
bid,i
T
)
.
Since φ is self-financing, then we have
∆φ0u =
K∑
i=1
(
φl,iu−1D
ask,i
u−1 − φ
s,i
u−1D
bid,i
u−1
)
−
K∑
i=1
(
1
∆φl,iu ≥0
ag,γu−1(∆φ
l,i
u ,D
ask,i)− 1
∆φl,iu <0
bg,γu−1(−∆φ
l,i
u ,D
ask,i)
− 1
∆φs,iu ≥0
bg,γu−1(∆φ
s,i
u ,D
bid,i) + 1
∆φs,iu <0
ag,γu−1(∆φ
s,i
u ,D
bid,i)
)
, u = 2, . . . , T.
For convenience, we use the following notations:
ψ0t = φ
0
t , t = 1, . . . , T,
ψit = φ
l,i
t , i = 1, . . . ,K, t = 1, . . . , T, (4.14)
ψjt = −φ
s,j−K
t , j = K + 1, . . . , 2K, t = 1, . . . , T.
Also, let us define D̂ as
D̂0 = D0,
D̂i = Dask,i, i = 1, . . . ,K,
D̂j = Dbid,j−K, j = K + 1, . . . , 2K.
Then, we have that
∆ψ0t =
2K∑
i=1
ψit−1D̂
i
t−1 −
2K∑
i=1
Egγ
[
∆ψit
T∑
s=t
D̂is
∣∣∣Ft−1], t = 2, . . . , T,
VT (φ) =ψ
0
T +
2K∑
i=1
ψiT D̂
i
T = ψ
0
1 +
T∑
s=2
∆ψ0s +
2K∑
i=1
ψiT D̂
i
T
=ψ01 +
T∑
s=2
( 2K∑
i=1
ψis−1D̂
i
s−1 −
2K∑
i=1
Egγ
[
∆ψis
T∑
u=s
D̂iu
∣∣∣Fs−1])+ 2K∑
i=1
ψiT D̂
i
T
=ψ01 +
T∑
s=2
( 2K∑
i=1
ψis−1D̂
i
s−1 −
2K∑
i=1
Egγ
[
∆ψis
T∑
u=s
D̂iu
∣∣∣Fs−1])+ 2K∑
i=1
(ψi1 +
T∑
s=2
∆ψis)D̂
i
T .
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By multiplying both sides by 12KT , and applying the conditional g-expectation Egγ [ · |FT−1] to both
sides, in view of Proposition 2.14.(v), we deduce
Egγ
[ 1
2KT
VT (φ)
∣∣∣FT−1] = 1
2TK
ψ01 +
1
2TK
T∑
s=2
2K∑
i=1
ψis−1D̂
i
s−1 −
1
2TK
T∑
s=2
2K∑
i=1
Egγ
[
∆ψis
T∑
u=s
D̂iu
∣∣∣Fs−1]
(4.15)
+ Egγ
[ 1
2KT
2K∑
i=1
(ψi1 +
T∑
s=2
∆ψis)D̂
i
T
∣∣∣FT−1]
≤
1
2KT
ψ01 +
1
2KT
T∑
s=2
2K∑
i=1
ψis−1D̂
i
s−1 −
1
2KT
T∑
s=2
2K∑
i=1
Egγ
[
∆ψis
T∑
u=s
D̂iu
∣∣∣Fs−1]
+
1
2KT
2K∑
i=1
Egγ
[
ψi1D̂
i
T
∣∣∣FT−1]+ 1
2KT
T∑
s=2
2K∑
i=1
Egγ
[
∆ψisD̂
i
T
∣∣∣FT−1]
=
1
2KT
ψ01 +
1
2KT
T∑
s=2
2K∑
i=1
ψis−1D̂
i
s−1 −
1
2KT
T−1∑
s=2
2K∑
i=1
Egγ
[
∆ψis
T∑
u=s
D̂iu
∣∣∣Fs−1]
+
1
2KT
2K∑
i=1
Egγ
[
ψi1D̂
i
T
∣∣∣FT−1]+ 1
2KT
T−1∑
s=2
2K∑
i=1
Egγ
[
∆ψisD̂
i
T
∣∣∣FT−1].
Since VT (φ) ≥ 0, P(VT (φ) > 0) > 0, then by Proposition 2.14.(ii) applied to the left hand side of
(4.15), we have that
Egγ
[ 1
2KT
VT (φ)
∣∣∣FT−1] ≥ 0, and P(Egγ[ 12KT VT (φ)∣∣∣FT−1] > 0) > 0.
Consequently,
ψ01 +
T−1∑
s=2
2K∑
i=1
ψis−1D̂
i
s−1 −
T−1∑
s=2
2K∑
i=1
Egγ
[
∆ψis
T∑
u=s
D̂iu
∣∣∣Fs−1]
+
2K∑
i=1
Egγ
[
ψi1
T∑
u=T−1
D̂iu
∣∣∣FT−1]+ T−1∑
s=2
2K∑
i=1
Egγ
[
∆ψis
T∑
u=T−1
D̂iu
∣∣∣FT−1] ≥ 0,
and the strict inequality holds on some set with positive probability. Let us use the notation
Πt :=ψ
0
1 +
t∑
s=2
2K∑
i=1
ψis−1D̂
i
s−1 −
t∑
s=2
2K∑
i=1
Egγ
[
∆ψis
T∑
u=s
D̂iu
∣∣∣Fs−1]
+
2K∑
i=1
Egγ
[
ψi1
T∑
u=t
D̂is
∣∣∣Ft]+ t∑
s=2
2K∑
i=1
Egγ
[
∆ψis
T∑
u=t
D̂iu
∣∣∣Ft], (4.16)
where t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}. We just showed that ΠT−1 ≥ 0 and P(ΠT−1 > 0) > 0. Next, we are
going to prove that Πt ≥ 0 and P(Πt > 0) > 0 will imply that Πt−1 ≥ 0, P(Πt−1 > 0) > 0, for any
t ∈ {2, . . . , T − 1}.
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Using Proposition 2.14.(iii)-(iv), we obtain that
Egγ
[ 1
2Kt
Πt
∣∣∣Ft−1] = 1
2Kt
(
ψ01 +
t∑
s=2
2K∑
i=1
ψis−1D̂
i
s−1 −
t∑
s=2
2K∑
i=1
Egγ
[
∆ψis
T∑
u=s
D̂iu
∣∣∣Fs−1])
+ Egγ
[ 1
2Kt
2K∑
i=1
Egγ
[
ψi1
T∑
u=t
D̂iu
∣∣∣Ft]+ 1
2Kt
t∑
s=2
2K∑
i=1
Egγ
[
∆ψis
T∑
u=t
D̂iu
∣∣∣Ft]∣∣∣Ft−1]
≤
1
2Kt
(
ψ01 +
t∑
s=2
2K∑
i=1
ψis−1D̂
i
s−1 −
t∑
s=2
2K∑
i=1
Egγ
[
∆ψis
T∑
u=s
D̂iu
∣∣∣Fs−1])
+
1
2Kt
2K∑
i=1
Egγ
[
ψi1
T∑
u=t
D̂iu
∣∣∣Ft−1]+ 1
2Kt
t∑
s=2
2K∑
i=1
Egγ
[
∆ψis
T∑
u=t
D̂iu
∣∣∣Ft−1]
=
1
2Kt
(
ψ01 +
t∑
s=2
2K∑
i=1
ψis−1D̂
i
s−1 −
t−1∑
s=2
2K∑
i=1
Egγ
[
∆ψis
T∑
u=s
D̂iu
∣∣∣Fs−1])
+
1
2Kt
2K∑
i=1
Egγ
[
ψi1
T∑
u=t
D̂iu
∣∣∣Ft−1]+ 1
2Kt
t−1∑
s=2
2K∑
i=1
Egγ
[
∆ψis
T∑
u=t
D̂iu
∣∣∣Ft−1]
=
1
2Kt
(
ψ01 +
t−1∑
s=2
2K∑
i=1
ψis−1D̂
i
s−1 −
t−1∑
s=2
2K∑
i=1
Egγ
[
∆ψis
T∑
u=s
D̂iu
∣∣∣Fs−1])
+
1
2Kt
2K∑
i=1
Egγ
[
ψi1
T∑
u=t−1
D̂iu
∣∣∣Ft−1]+ 1
2Kt
t−1∑
s=2
2K∑
i=1
Egγ
[
∆ψis
T∑
u=t−1
D̂iu
∣∣∣Ft−1]
=
1
2Kt
Πt−1,
for t ∈ {2, . . . , T − 1}. Since Πt ≥ 0 and P(Πt > 0) > 0, then according to Proposition 2.14.(ii), we
get that Egγ
[
1
2KtΠt
∣∣∣Ft−1] and P(Egγ[ 12KtΠt∣∣∣Ft−1] > 0) > 0, and thus Πt−1 ≥ 0, P(Πt−1 > 0) > 0.
Hence, by backward induction, it is true that
Π1 = ψ
0
1 +
2K∑
i=1
Egγ
[
ψi1
T∑
s=1
D̂is
∣∣∣F1] ≥ 0,
and P(Π1 > 0) > 0. Consequently, in view of (4.14) and the representation for a
g,γ and bg,γ (cf.
Theorem 4.16) we obtain that
0 ≤
1
2K
ψ01 +
1
2K
2K∑
i=1
Egγ
[
ψi1
T∑
s=1
D̂is
]
=
1
2K
φ01 +
1
2K
K∑
i=1
(
ag,γ0 (φ
l,i
1 ,D
ask,i)− bg,γ0 (−φ
s,i
1 ,D
bid,i)
)
,
and
P
(
φ01 +
K∑
i=1
(
ag,γ0 (φ
l,i
1 ,D
ask,i)− bg,γ0 (−φ
s,i
1 ,D
bid,i)
)
> 0
)
> 0. (4.17)
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Since φ is a self-financing, then
ψ01 = −
K∑
i=1
(
ag,γ0 (φ
l,i
1 ,D
ask,i)− bg,γ0 (−φ
s,i
1 ,D
bid,i)
)
.
Thus, (4.17) means that P(0 > 0) > 0, which is a contradiction.
Proposition 4.26. Assume that (M, P ask, P bid) = (M, ag,γ , bg,γ), γ > 0. Then, properties (M5)
and (M6) hold true.
Proof. Due to Theorem 4.16.P3, we have that P askt (λϕ
1 + (1 − λ)ϕ2, D˜) ≤ λP askt (ϕ
1, D˜) + (1 −
λ)P askt (ϕ
2, D˜), and P bidt (λϕ
1+(1−λ)ϕ2, D˜) ≥ λP bidt (ϕ
1, D˜)+ (1−λ)P bidt (ϕ
2, D˜), for any D˜ ∈ M,
λ ∈ L∞(Ft), 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, t ∈ T , which implies that condition (M5) is satisfied.
We are left to show that (M6) holds. In view of Theorem 4.16.P1, we have that
λP askt (ϕ
1, D˜)− (1− λ)P bidt (−ϕ
2, D˜) = λEgγ
[
ϕ1
T∑
s=t+1
D˜s
∣∣∣Ft]+ (1− λ)Egγ[ϕ2 T∑
s=t+1
D˜s
∣∣∣Ft]
≥ Egγ
[
ϑ
T∑
s=t+1
D˜s
∣∣∣Ft] = 1ϑ≥0P askt (ϑ, D˜)− 1ϑ<0P bidt (−ϑ, D˜).
This concludes the proof.
In Theorem 4.25, we showed that if we take a family of drivers g = (gx)x>0, and if we choose
the same acceptability level γ > 0 to define the ask and bid prices, then the market model using
such prices is valid and arbitrage free. In next section, using the results from the current section,
we will prove that market model is still arbitrage free even we choose different acceptability level
for the two trading sides.
4.4.2 Ask and Bid Prices Computed at Different Acceptability Levels
Let g be a family of drivers that satisfies Assumption G. Also, let γ1, γ2 > 0. We consider the
market model (M, ag,γ1 , bg,γ2). That is P askt (ϕ, D˜) = a
g,γ1
t (ϕ, D˜) and P
bid
t (ϕ, D˜) = b
g,γ2
t (ϕ, D˜), for
D˜ ∈ M, ϕ ∈ L∞+ (Ft).
Similarly as in Section 4.4.1, it is not hard to verify here that the market model of the present
section satisfies properties (M2), (M3) and (M4), and we leave the verification of these properties to
the reader. At this time we are unable to verify that property (M6) holds for this market. However,
we can verify that property (M5) holds.
Theorem 4.27. The market model (M, ag,γ1 , bg,γ2), γ1, γ2 > 0, is arbitrage free.
Proof. First, we consider the case γ1 ≤ γ2. We will prove the result by contradiction. Namely,
we will assume that market model (M, ag,γ1 , bg,γ2) admits an arbitrage, and we will conclude that
market model (M, ag,γ1 , bg,γ1) also admits an arbitrage, which is impossible in view of Theorem 4.25.
Intuitively, the statement and its proof is clear: since bg,γ1 ≥ bg,γ2 , one will trade at higher bid
prices in the new market (M, ag,γ1 , bg,γ1), and hence it is enough to trade in this market all assets
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but banking account according to the arbitrage strategy from (M, ag,γ1 , bg,γ2). Finally, the banking
account is set up such that the trading strategy remains self-financing in (M, ag,γ1 , bg,γ1).
Let us assume that the market model (M, ag,γ1 , bg,γ2) admits an arbitrage opportunity, which,
according to Proposition 4.9, means that there is a trading strategy φ ∈ S(0, ag,γ1 , bg,γ2), such
that VT (φ) ≥ 0 and P(VT (φ) > 0) > 0. Using φ, we will construct an arbitrage strategy ψ ∈
S(0, ag,γ1 , bg,γ1). Specifically, we set
ψ01 = −
K∑
i=1
(
ag,γ10 (φ
l,i
1 ,D
ask,i)− bg,γ10 (φ
s,i
1 ,D
bid,i)
)
,
ψ
l/s,i
1 = φ
l/s,i
1 , i = 1, . . . ,K,
and
ψ0t = ψ
0
1 +
t∑
u=2
ζu, t = 2, . . . , T,
ψit = φ
i
t, i = 1, . . . ,K, t = 2, . . . , T,
where
ζ0t =
K∑
i=1
(
φl,it−1D
ask,i
t−1 − φ
s,i
t−1D
bid,i
t−1
)
−
K∑
i=1
(
1
∆φl,it ≥0
ag,γ1t−1 (∆φ
l,i
t ,D
ask,i)− 1
∆φl,it <0
bg,γ1t−1 (−∆φ
l,i
t ,D
ask,i)
− 1
∆φs,it ≥0
bg,γ1t−1 (∆φ
s,i
t ,D
bid,i) + 1
∆φs,it <0
ag,γ1t−1 (−∆φ
s,i
t ,D
bid,i)
)
, t = 2, . . . , T.
First, we will show that ψ ∈ S(0, ag,γ1 , bg,γ1). We have that4
V γ10 (ψ) =∆ψ
0
1 +
K∑
i=1
(
1
∆ψl,i1 ≥0
P ask0 (∆ψ
l,i
1 ,D
ask,i)− 1
∆ψl,i1 <0
P bid0 (−∆ψ
l,i
1 ,D
ask,i)
− 1
∆ψs,i1 ≥0
P bid0 (∆ψ
s,i
1 ,D
bid) + 1
∆ψs,i1 <0
P ask0 (−∆ψ
s,i
1 ,D
bid)
)
=−
K∑
i=1
(
ag,γ10 (φ
l,i
1 ,D
ask,i)− bg,γ10 (φ
s,i
1 ,D
bid,i)
)
+
K∑
i=1
(
ag,γ10 (φ
l,i
1 ,D
ask,i)− bg,γ10 (φ
s,i
1 ,D
bid,i)
)
=0 =
K∑
i=1
(
ψl,i1 D
ask,i
0 − ψ
s,i
1 D
bid,i
0
)
,
4Here, we are using the convention that V γ1 is computed relative to the model (M, ag,γ1 , bg,γ1), and that V γ1,γ2
is computed relative to the model (M, ag,γ1 , bg,γ2).
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and
∆ψ0t+1 +
K∑
i=1
(
1
∆ψl,it+1≥0
P askt (∆ψ
l,i
t+1,D
ask,i)− 1
∆ψl,it+1<0
P bidt (−∆ψ
l,i
t+1,D
ask,i)
− 1
∆ψs,it+1≥0
P bidt (∆ψ
s,i
t+1,D
bid) + 1
∆ψs,it+1<0
P askt (−∆ψ
s,i
t+1,D
bid)
)
=ζ0t+1 +
K∑
i=1
(
1
∆φl,is ≥0
ag,γ1s−1(∆φ
l,i
s ,D
ask,i)− 1
∆φl,is <0
bg,γ1s−1(−∆φ
l,i
s ,D
ask,i)
− 1
∆φs,is ≥0
bg,γ1s−1(∆φ
s,i
s ,D
bid,i) + 1
∆φs,is <0
ag,γ1s−1(−∆φ
s,i
s ,D
bid,i)
)
=
K∑
i=1
(ψl,it D
ask,i
t − ψ
s,i
t D
bid,i
t ),
for every t = 2, . . . , T . Hence, ψ is a self-financing trading strategy and ψ ∈ S(0, ag,γ1 , bg,γ1).
Next we will show that ψ01 ≥ φ
0
1 and ∆ψ
0
t ≥ ∆φ
0
t , t ∈ {2, . . . , T}, which will imply that
V γ1T (ψ) = ψ
0
1 +
T∑
t=2
ψ0t ≥ φ
0
1 +
T∑
t=2
φ0t = V
γ1,γ2
T (φ).
Consequently, we have that V γ1T (ψ) ≥ 0 and P(V
γ1
T (ψ) > 0) > 0, and thus ψ is an arbitrage
opportunity in market model (M, ag,γ1 , bg,γ1), which contradicts Theorem 4.25.
Since γ1 ≤ γ2, by Proposition 4.21, we get that b
g,γ1
t (ϕ,D) ≥ b
g,γ2
t (ϕ,D), for any ϕ ∈ L
∞
+ (Ft)
and D ∈ D. Hence,
ψ01 = −
K∑
i=1
(
ag,γ10 (φ
l,i
1 ,D
ask,i)− bg,γ10 (φ
s,i
1 ,D
bid,i)
)
≥ −
K∑
i=1
(
ag,γ10 (φ
l,i
1 ,D
ask,i)− bg,γ20 (φ
s,i
1 ,D
bid,i)
)
= φ01,
and it is clear that ∆ψ0t = ζt, t ∈ {2, . . . , T}. Moreover,
∆ψ0t =
K∑
i=1
(
φl,it−1D
ask,i
t−1 − φ
s,i
t−1D
bid,i
t−1
)
−
K∑
i=1
(
1
∆φl,it ≥0
ag,γ1t−1 (∆φ
l,i
t ,D
ask,i)− 1
∆φl,it <0
bg,γ1t−1 (−∆φ
l,i
t ,D
ask,i)
− 1
∆φs,it ≥0
bg,γ1t−1 (∆φ
s,i
t ,D
bid,i) + 1
∆φs,it <0
ag,γ1t−1 (−∆φ
s,i
t ,D
bid,i)
)
≥
K∑
i=1
(
φl,it−1D
ask,i
t−1 − φ
s,i
t−1D
bid,i
t−1
)
−
K∑
i=1
(
1
∆φl,it ≥0
ag,γ1t−1 (∆φ
l,i
t ,D
ask,i)− 1
∆φl,it <0
bg,γ2t−1 (−∆φ
l,i
t ,D
ask,i)
− 1
∆φs,it ≥0
bg,γ2t−1 (∆φ
s,i
t ,D
bid,i) + 1
∆φs,it <0
ag,γ1t−1 (−∆φ
s,i
t ,D
bid,i)
)
=∆φ0t ,
for every t = 2, . . . , T . Therefore, we have that ψ0T = ψ
0
1 +
∑T
t=2∆ψ
0
t ≥ φ
0
1 +
∑T
t=2∆φ
0
t = φ
0
T .
The proof for γ1 ≥ γ2 is analogues.
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5 Derivatives Valuation with Dynamic Conic Finance
The aim of this section is to build a pricing methodology for general contingent claims, by using
the theory of dynamic acceptability indices. We assume that there exists an underlying market5
(M, P ask, P bid) that satisfies conditions (M1)-(M6). We will use the securities from underlying
market as hedging instruments.
We start by introducing the concept of super-hedging in our context.
Definition 5.1. Assume that (M, P ask, P bid) is the underlying market, and let V (φ) be the liqui-
dation value process generated by the trading strategy φ ∈ S(t) for some fixed t ∈ T . A cashflow
H ∈ D, is said to be super-hedged at zero-cost by φ, if Hs = 0, s ≤ t, and
u∑
s=t+1
Hs ≤ Vu(φ), u = t+ 1, . . . , T. (5.1)
Remark 5.2. If (5.1) becomes equality, then we say H can be replicated by φ. Clearly, if H ∈ H0(t),
then it is hedgeable.
Based on Definition 5.1, we introduce the set of cashflows that can be super-hedged by strategies
φ ∈ S(t) at zero cost:
H(t) :=
{(
0, . . . , 0,∆(Vt+1(φ)− Zt+1), . . . ,∆(VT (φ)− ZT )
)
: φ ∈ S(t), Z ∈ L+(t)
}
, (5.2)
where
L+(t) :=
{
(Zs)
T
s=0 : Zs ∈ L
2
+(Ω,Fs,P), Zs = 0, s ≤ t
}
, (5.3)
for t ∈ T .
We proceed by defining acceptability ask and bid prices of a derivative cashflow D.
Definition 5.3. Let g = (gx)x>0 be a family of drivers that satisfy Assumption G. The acceptability
ask price of ϕ ∈ L∞+ (Ft) shares of the cashflow D, at level γ, at time t ∈ T , is defined as
âg,γt (ϕ,D) = ess inf{a ∈ Ft : ∃H ∈ H(t) so that α
g
t (δt(a) +H − δ
+
t (ϕD)) ≥ γ}, (5.4)
and the acceptability bid price of ϕ ≥ 0, ϕ ∈ L∞+ (Ft), shares of D, at level γ, at time t ∈ T is
defined as
b̂g,γt (ϕ,D) = ess sup{b ∈ Ft : ∃H ∈ H(t) so that α
g
t (δ
+
t (ϕD) +H − δt(b)) ≥ γ}. (5.5)
Remark 5.4. If H(t) is equal to {(0, . . . , 0)}, which means hedging is not admitted, then
âg,γt (ϕ,D) = ess inf{a ∈ Ft : α
g
t (δt(a)− δ
+
t (ϕD)) ≥ γ}
= ag,γt (ϕ,D),
and
b̂g,γt (ϕ,D) = ess sup{b ∈ Ft : α
g
t (δ
+
t (ϕD) − δt(b)) ≥ γ}
= bg,γt (ϕ,D).
5Note that in view of previous section such markets exist.
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Remark 5.5. Clearly, âg,γt (ϕ,D) ≤ a
g,γ
t (ϕ,D) and b̂
g,γ
t (ϕ,D) ≤ b
g,γ
t (ϕ,D), for ϕ ∈ L
∞
+ (Ft), D ∈ D.
The prices in the underlying market generated by (5.4) and (5.5) fall in the arbitrage free price
interval with the underlying market is defined as in Section 4.4.1. In addition, the ask-bid spread
is narrower. Moreover, as we will show later, similar results hold true if we just assume that the
underlying market model is arbitrage free.
Similar as in Section 4.3, we note that âg,γt (ϕ,D) = â
g,γ
t (1, ϕD) and b̂
g,γ
t (ϕ,D) = b̂
g,γ
t (1, ϕD),
and thus, we will prove most of the results for âg,γt (1,D) and b̂
g,γ
t (1,D), and the general case follow
immediately.
Proposition 5.6. The acceptability ask and bid prices admit the following representations
âg,γt (D) = ess inf
H∈H(t)
Egγ
[
T∑
s=t+1
(Ds −Hs)
∣∣∣Ft
]
,
b̂g,γt (D) = ess sup
H∈H(t)
−Egγ
[
T∑
s=t+1
(−Hs −Ds)
∣∣∣Ft
]
,
(5.6)
for D ∈ D, at level γ > 0, at time t ∈ T .
Proof. We show the proof of first equality; the proof for the bid price is similar.
From the definition of âg,γt , we get that
âg,γt (D) = ess inf
{
a ∈ Ft : ∃H ∈ H(t), Egγ
[
T∑
s=t+1
(Ds −Hs)
∣∣∣Ft
]
≤ a
}
,
and consequently
ess inf
H∈H(t)
Egγ
[
T∑
s=t+1
(Ds −Hs)
∣∣∣Ft
]
≤ ess inf
{
a ∈ Ft : ∃H ∈ H(t), Egγ
[
T∑
s=t+1
(Ds −Hs)
∣∣∣Ft
]
≤ a
}
.
(5.7)
To prove the converse inequality, we show that strict inequality in (5.7) does not hold true. Assume
that on some set A ∈ Ft, P(A) > 0, we have that
ess inf
H∈H(t)
Egγ
[
T∑
s=t+1
(Ds −Hs)
∣∣∣Ft
]
< ess inf
{
a ∈ Ft : ∃H ∈ H(t), Egγ
[
T∑
s=t+1
(Ds −Hs)
∣∣∣Ft
]
≤ a
}
.
Then, there exists an H ′ ∈ H, such that on A
Egγ
[
T∑
s=t+1
(Ds −H
′
s)
∣∣∣Ft
]
< ess inf
{
a ∈ Ft : ∃H ∈ H(t), Egγ
[
T∑
s=t+1
(Ds −Hs)
∣∣∣Ft
]
≤ a
}
.
Consider b ∈ Ft, such that on set A
Egγ
[
T∑
s=t+1
(Ds −H
′
s)
∣∣∣Ft
]
< b < ess inf
{
a ∈ Ft : ∃H ∈ H(t), Egγ
[
T∑
s=t+1
(Ds −Hs)
∣∣∣Ft
]
≤ a
}
.
(5.8)
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Then, we have that 1Ab ∈
{
a ∈ Ft : ∃H ∈ H(t), 1AEgγ
[∑T
s=t+1(Ds −Hs)
∣∣∣Ft] ≤ a}. Hence, for
almost all ω ∈ A, we get âg,γt (D)(ω) ≤ b(ω). However, by (5.8), we also have that â
g,γ
t (D)(ω) > b(ω)
for such ω’s, that leads to a contradiction. This concludes the proof.
Next, we introduce the concept of good-deals for sets of cashflows, which plays an essential role
in derivation of fundamental properties of the ask and bid prices. Towards this end, let (ργt )x>0 be
an increasing family of dynamic risk measures:
Definition 5.7. A good-deal for H(t), at time t ∈ T , and at level γ > 0, is a cashflow H ∈ H(t),
such that ργt (H)(ω) < 0, fop ω ∈ A, for some A ∈ Ft, and P(A) > 0. Respectively, we say that the
no-good-deal condition (NGD) holds true for H(t), at time t ∈ T , and at level γ > 0, if ργt (H) ≥ 0
for any H ∈ H(t).
Similar to no-arbitrage (NA) condition for H0(t), we define the NA condition for the set H(t),
that is, there does not exist H ∈ H(t) such that
∑T
s=t+1Hs ≥ 0 and P(
∑T
s=t+1Hs > 0) > 0. As
next result shows, there exists a direct relationship between no-good-deal condition and no-arbitrage
condition.
Proposition 5.8. Let g = (gx)x>0 be a family of drivers that satisfy Assumption G, and let (ρ
gx
t )x>0
be the corresponding family of dynamic risk measures. If NGD holds for H(t) at level γ > 0, and
t ∈ T , then NA also holds for H(t).
Proof. If NGD holds for H(t) at level γ > 0, then we have
Egγ
[
−
T∑
s=t+1
Hs
∣∣Ft] ≥ 0, (5.9)
for all H ∈ H(t). Assume that there is an arbitrage opportunity at time t, i.e. there exists
H ′ ∈ H(t), A ∈ FT , such that
∑T
s=t+1H
′
s ≥ 0, P(A) > 0 and
∑T
s=t+1H
′
s(ω) > 0, ω ∈ A. By
Theorem 2.6, we get that
Egγ
[
−
T∑
s=t+1
H ′s
∣∣∣Ft] ≤ 0,
and
Egγ
[
−
T∑
s=t+1
H ′s
∣∣∣Ft](ω) < 0, ω ∈ A.
which contradicts (5.9). This concludes the proof.
Remark 5.9. In [BCIR13], the authors prove a similar result to Proposition 5.8 that corresponds to
the case of dynamic coherent risk measure, that shows that NA for H(t) is equivalent to NGD at
the some level γ > 0. Although we are able to show only one implication in our setup, the notion
of NGD still plays an essential role in the study of properties of the proposed acceptability ask and
bid prices. In particular, we will show that under NGD condition, the acceptability bid and ask
prices satisfy properties similar to those in Theorem 4.16.
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Moreover, if we assume that the acceptability prices are computed by using an acceptability
level γ > 0, and if the NGD condition does not hold true at this level, then there exists some
H ∈ H(t) and A ∈ Ft such that P(A) > 0, and ρ
gγ
t (H) < 0, on A. Let us consider the ask price of
cashflow (0, . . . , 0). According to Proposition 5.6, we immediately get that âg,γt (0)(ω) < 0, on A,
i.e. the price of zero cashflow is not equal to zero, which leads to an inconsistent pricing theory.
Proposition 5.10. Assume that NGD holds for H(t) at level γ > 0 and some fixed t ∈ T . Then,
for any D ∈ D, we have âg,γt (D) ≥ b̂
g,γ
t (D).
Proof. We prove the statement by contradiction. Assume that there exists some D ∈ D, A ∈ Ft,
P(A) > 0, such that b̂g,γt (D)(ω) > â
g,γ
t (D)(ω), on A. Then, by Proposition 5.6, we have that
ess sup
H∈H(t)
−Egγ
[ T∑
s=t+1
(−Hs −Ds)
∣∣∣Ft](ω) > ess inf
H∈H(t)
Egγ
[ T∑
s=t+1
(Ds −Hs)
∣∣∣Ft](ω),
where ω ∈ A. Let M = (̂bg,γt (D) + â
g,γ
t (D))/2. Then, there exists H
1,H2 ∈ H(t) such that
−Egγ
[ T∑
s=t+1
(−H1s −Ds)
∣∣∣Ft](ω) > M(ω) > Egγ[ T∑
s=t+1
(Ds −H
2
s )
∣∣∣Ft](ω),
for ω ∈ A. Hence, we get that
Egγ
[ T∑
s=t+1
(−H1s −Ds)
∣∣∣Ft](ω) + Egγ[ T∑
s=t+1
(Ds −H
2
s )
∣∣∣Ft](ω) < 0, ω ∈ A. (5.10)
On the other hand, in view of Proposition 2.14.(vi), we have
Egγ
[1
2
( T∑
s=t+1
(−H1s −Ds) +
T∑
s=t+1
(Ds −H
2
s )
)∣∣∣Ft]
≤
1
2
(
Egγ
[ T∑
s=t+1
(−H1s −Ds)
∣∣∣Ft]+ Egγ[ T∑
s=t+1
(Ds −H
2
s )
∣∣∣Ft]),
which combined with (5.10), and using (3.1), we obtain
ρg,γt (
1
2
(H1 +H2))(ω) = Egγ
[1
2
T∑
s=t+1
(−H1s −H
2
s )
∣∣∣Ft](ω) < 0,
for ω ∈ A. However, by Proposition A.5, we have that 12(H
1 + H2) ∈ H(t), and since NGD is
satisfied for all H ∈ H(t), we have that ρg,γt (
1
2 (H
1+H2)) ≥ 0, which leads to a contradiction. The
proof is complete.
Using the above proposition, we will show that under NGD condition the prices of cashflows
from H(t) are equal to zero.
Proposition 5.11. Assume that NGD holds for H(t) at level γ > 0, at time t ∈ T . Then,
âg,γt (D) = b̂
g,γ
t (D) = 0, for any D ∈ H(t).
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Proof. Since D ∈ H(t), then D − δ+t (D) = 0, and thus
âg,γt (D) = ess inf{a ∈ Ft : ∃H ∈ H(t), s.t. α
g
t (δt(a) +H − δ
+
t (D)) ≥ γ} ≤ 0.
Similarly, b̂g,γt (D) ≥ 0, and therefore â
g,γ
t (D) ≤ 0 ≤ b̂
g,γ
t (D). On the other hand, by Proposi-
tion 5.10, âg,γt (D) ≥ b̂
g,γ
t (D). Hence, â
g,γ
t (D) = b̂
g,γ
t (D) = 0.
Next we will show that pricing the underlying securities D ∈ M by the bid and ask acceptability
prices defined by (5.5) and (5.4) yields the market prices P ask/bid of these securities.
Proposition 5.12. Fix t ∈ T . Assume that NGD holds for H(t) at level γ > 0, at time t ∈ T .
Then,
âg,γt (ϕ, D˜) = P
ask
t (ϕ, D˜)
b̂g,γt (ϕ, D˜) = P
bid
t (ϕ, D˜),
for any ϕ ∈ L∞+ (Ft), and D˜ ∈ M.
Proof. Since D˜ ∈ M, thenH := (0, . . . , 0, ϕD˜t+1−P
ask
t (ϕ, D˜), ϕD˜t+2, . . . , ϕD˜T ) ∈ H(t). Therefore,
by Proposition 5.11, we get âg,γt (H) = 0, which is equivalent to
ess inf
H∈H(t)
Egγ
[ T∑
s=t+1
(ϕD˜s −Hs)− P
ask
t (ϕ, D˜)
∣∣∣Ft] = 0.
Note that P askt (ϕ, D˜) is Ft-measurable, and it does not depend on the argument H ∈ H(t) over
which the ess inf is taken. Hence, we immediately get that
P askt (ϕ, D˜) = ess inf
H∈H(t)
Egγ
[ T∑
s=t+1
(ϕD˜s −Hs)
∣∣∣Ft] = âg,γt (ϕ, D˜).
The proof for the bid price is analogous.
In [CM10] and [BCIR13], the authors consider ask-bid prices produced by coherent acceptability
indices. However, in some literature there are arguments that coherent acceptability indices fail
to take liquidity risk into account. In our set-up, acceptability indices are assumed to be quasi-
concave and we will show that corresponding ask-bid prices reflect liquidity risk as in the following
proposition.
Proposition 5.13. The acceptability ask and bid prices satisfy
âg,γt (λD
1 + (1− λ)D2) ≤ λâg,γt (D
1) + (1− λ)âg,γt (D
2), (5.11)
b̂g,γt (λD
1 + (1− λ)D2) ≥ λb̂g,γt (D
1) + (1− λ)̂bg,γt (D
2), (5.12)
for D1,D2 ∈ D, λ ∈ Ft, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, at level γ > 0, at time t ∈ T .
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Proof. Due to Proposition 5.6, we have that By convexity of g-expectation, for any H1,H2 ∈ H(t),
λ ∈ Ft, we have that
λEgγ
[ T∑
s=t+1
(D1s −H
1
s )
∣∣∣Ft]+(1− λ)Egγ[ T∑
s=t+1
(D2s −H
2
s )
∣∣∣Ft]
≥Egγ
[ T∑
s=t+1
(λD1s + (1− λ)D
2
s −H
3
s )
∣∣∣Ft],
where H3 = λH1 + (1 − λ)H2. Due to convexity of H(t) (see Proposition A.5), we have that
H3 ∈ H(t). Consequently, using Proposition 5.6, we continue
λâg,γt (D
1) + (1− λ)âg,γt (D
2)
= ess inf
H1,H2∈H(t)
(
λEgγ
[ T∑
s=t+1
(D1s −H
1
s )
∣∣∣Ft]+ (1− λ)Egγ[ T∑
s=t+1
(D2s −H
2
s )
∣∣∣Ft])
≥ ess inf
H1,H2∈H(t)
Egγ
[ T∑
s=t+1
(λD1s + (1− λ)D
2
s −H
3
s )
∣∣∣Ft]
≥ ess inf
H∈H(t)
Egγ
[ T∑
s=t+1
(λD1s + (1− λ)D
2
s −Hs)
∣∣∣Ft]
=âg,γt (λD
1 + (1− λ)D2).
The proof of (5.12) is similar. This conclude the proof.
As an immediate consequence of Proposition 5.11 and Proposition 5.13 we deduce the following
result about market impact on acceptability ask and bid prices. Namely we show that the accept-
ability bid and ask prices are not homogenous in number of shares traded - larger number of shares
one trades, a higher price per share it will cost.
Corollary 5.14. Assume that NGD holds for H(t) at level γ > 0, t ∈ T . Then, the acceptability
ask and bid prices satisfy the following inequalities
âg,γt (λϕ,D) ≤ λâ
g,γ
t (ϕ,D), b̂
g,γ
t (λϕ,D) ≥ λb̂
g,γ
t (ϕ,D), λ, ϕ ∈ L
∞
+ (Ft), 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1;
âg,γt (λϕ,D) ≥ λâ
g,γ
t (ϕ,D), b̂
g,γ
t (λϕ,D) ≤ λb̂
g,γ
t (ϕ,D), λ, ϕ ∈ L
∞
+ (Ft), λ ≥ 1,
for γ > 0, t ∈ T .
Finally we move to the central question of this section - the absence of arbitrage in the market
model driven by acceptability bid and ask prices as defined above. Recall that the starting point
was the notion of hedgeable cashflows H(t) initiated at time t at zero cost and generated by self-
financing trading strategies in the underlying market. Similarly, we consider the set of extended
cashflows defined next.
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Definition 5.15. The set of extended cashflows associated with an Ft-measurable random variable
St, t ∈ T , and a process D ∈ D, is defined as
H˜(t, St) :=
{(
0, . . . , 0, St,Ht+1 − ϕDt+1, . . . ,HT − ϕDT
)
: H ∈ H(t), ϕ ∈ L2(Ft)
}
.
The quantity St should be viewed as the set-up cost of ϕ shares of the cashflow D at time t ∈ T .
Consistently with Proposition 4.9, we say that that the acceptability ask price (5.4) is arbitrage
free price, if there does not exist a cashflow H˜ ∈ H˜(t, âg,γt (ϕ,D)) such that
T∑
s=t
H˜s ≥ 0, P(
T∑
s=t
H˜s > 0) > 0. (5.13)
Similarly, the bid price (5.5) is arbitrage free price, if there is no H˜ ∈ H˜(t,−b̂g,γt (ϕ,D)) that satisfies
(5.13).
Theorem 5.16. Assume that NGD holds for H(t), t ∈ T . Then, then acceptability ask and bid
prices are arbitrage-free prices.
Proof. We give the proof for ask prices; the proof for bid prices is similar and we omit it here.
If there exists H˜ ∈ H˜(t, âg,γt (ϕ,D)) such that (5.13) is satisfied, then there exists H
′ ∈ H(t),
A ∈ Ft such that
âg,γt (ϕ,D) ≥ −
T∑
s=t+1
(H ′s −Ds),
and the inequality is strict on set A.
In view of Proposition 5.6, we immediately get that
Egγ
[ T∑
s=t+1
(Ds −H
′
s)
∣∣∣Ft] ≥ T∑
s=t+1
(Ds −H
′
s)
with strict inequality on A. Consequently, by Theorem 2.14, we conclude that
Egγ
[ T∑
s=t+1
(Ds −H
′
s)
]
(ω) =Egγ
[
Egγ
[ T∑
s=t+1
(Ds −H
′
s)
∣∣∣Ft]](ω)
>Egγ
[ T∑
s=t+1
(Ds −H
′
s)
]
(ω),
for ω ∈ A, with P(A) > 0, that leads to a contradiction. Hence, the acceptability ask price
âg,γt (ϕ,D) is an arbitrage free price. The proof is complete.
Similar to the discussion in Section 4.4, we study the relationship between the acceptability ask
and bid prices in the case when these prices are generated by different families of drivers and and
different acceptability levels. We start with a result similar to Proposition 4.21.
Proposition 5.17. The acceptability ask and bid prices at time t ∈ T of a cashflow D ∈ D, satisfy
the following inequalities âg,γ1t (D) ≤ â
g,γ2
t (D) and b̂
g,γ1
t (D) ≥ b̂
g,γ2
t (D), for γ2 ≥ γ1 > 0.
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Proof. Since gγ1 ≤ gγ2 , according to Theorem 2.6, we get that
Egγ1
[ T∑
s=t+1
(Ds −Hs)
∣∣∣Ft] ≤ Egγ2[ T∑
s=t+1
(Ds −Hs)
∣∣∣Ft],
for any H ∈ H(t). Hence, using the representation (5.6), we obtain
âg,γ1t (D) = ess inf
H∈H(t)
Egγ1
[ T∑
s=t+1
(Ds −Hs)
∣∣∣Ft] ≤ ess inf
H∈H(t)
Egγ2
[ T∑
s=t+1
(Ds −Hs)
∣∣∣Ft] ≤ âg,γ2t (D).
Analogously, one proofs the corresponding inequality for the bid prices.
Corollary 5.18. Assume that NGD holds for H(t) at time t ∈ T , and at levels γ1, γ2 > 0. Then,
âg,γ2t (D) ≥ b̂
g,γ1
t (D), for any d ∈ D.
Proof. If γ1 ≥ γ2, then by Proposition 5.10 and 5.17, we have that â
g,γ2
t (D) ≥ b̂
g,γ2
t (D) ≥ b̂
g,γ1
t (D).
Similarly, if γ1 ≤ γ2, then â
g,γ2
t (D) ≥ â
g,γ1
t (D) ≥ b̂
g,γ1
t (D). This completes the proof.
Finally we want to mention that we were not able to establish a general result on comparison
of acceptability bid and ask prices, similar to Proposition 4.20. Generally speaking we do not know
if âg
1,γ1 ≥ b̂g
2,γ2 , for some arbitrary family of drivers g1, g2, and levels γ1, γ2 > 0. In the nutshell,
this is due to the lack of an appropriate form of time consistency property for âg,γ , and b̂g,γ , similar
to Property P5, in Theorem 4.16. We leave the answer to this question for further investigations.
Nevertheless, we do have a result that shows that once two couterparties, who may use different
acceptability levels and different drivers, find that their prices are such that âg
1,γ1
t (D) ≤ b̂
g2,γ2
t (D)
for all D ∈ D, then the bid and ask prices coincide and hence the trade will go through.
Proposition 5.19. Fix t ∈ T . Let g1 and g2 be two families of drivers. Assume that âg
1,γ1
t (D) ≤
b̂g
2,γ2
t (D), for a fixed t ∈ T , and for any D ∈ D. Then,
âg
1,γ1
t (D) = b̂
g1,γ1
t (D) = â
g2,γ2
t (D) = b̂
g2,γ2
t (D),
for any D ∈ D.
Proof. Since âg
1,γ1
t (D) ≤ b̂
g2,γ2
t (D) for any D ∈ D, then we have that
âg
1,γ1
t (−D) ≤ b̂
g2,γ2
t (−D), D ∈ D.
According to Proposition 5.6, it is clear that
âg
1,γ1
t (D) = −b̂
g1,γ1
t (−D),
âg
2,γ2
t (D) = −b̂
g2,γ2
t (−D).
Therefore, −b̂g
1,γ1
t (D) = â
g1,γ1
t (−D) ≤ b̂
g2,γ2
t (−D) = −â
g2,γ2
t (D), for anyD ∈ D. Hence, â
g2,γ2
t (D) ≤
b̂g
1,γ1
t (D), and due to Proposition 5.10, we get that
b̂g
2,γ2
t (D) ≤ â
g2,γ2
t (D) ≤ b̂
g1,γ1
t (D) ≤ â
g1,γ1
t (D), D ∈ D.
Thus, using our initial assumptions, we have that
b̂g
2,γ2
t (D) = â
g2,γ2
t (D) = b̂
g1,γ1
t (D) = â
g1,γ1
t (D), D ∈ D.
This concludes the proof.
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A Appendix
This section is devoted to some auxiliary technical results, used throughout the paper.
Proposition A.1. Assume that W is a symmetric random walk, such that P (∆Wt = ±1) =
1
2 ,
t = 1, . . . , T , and let {FWt }
T
t=0 be the filtration generated by W . Then, for any square integrable
martingale process X on (Ω,FW , {FWt }
T
t=0,P}, there exists a predictable process ξ, such that
∆Xt = ξt∆Wt, t = 1, . . . , T.
Proof. According to the Galtchouk-Kunita-Watanabe [FS04, Theorem 10.18] decomposition, X
admits the following representation
∆Xt = ξt∆Wt +∆Mt, (A.1)
where ξ is a predictable process such that ξt∆Wt ∈ L
2(Ft), for t = 1, . . . , T , and M is a square-
integrable martingale which is orthogonal to W and such that M0 = 0. Since M is orthogonal to
W , and using the fact that ∆〈W 〉t = 1, we get
ξt =
E[∆Xt∆Wt|Ft−1]
∆〈W 〉t
= E[∆Xt∆Wt|Ft−1], t = 1, . . . , T. (A.2)
Next, we fix t ∈ {1, . . . , T}. Clearly ∆Xt = ft(∆W1, . . . ,∆Wt), for some function f . Conse-
quently, we have that
E[∆Xt∆Wt|Ft−1] = E[∆Xt1∆Wt=1|Ft−1]− E[∆Xt1∆Wt=−1|Ft−1]
= ft(∆W1, . . . ,∆Wt−1, 1)E[1∆Wt=1|Ft−1]− ft(∆W1, . . . ,∆Wt−1,−1)E[1∆Wt=−1|Ft−1]
=
1
2
ft(∆W1, . . . ,∆Wt−1, 1)−
1
2
ft(∆W1, . . . ,∆Wt−1,−1). (A.3)
By similar reasoning, since E[∆Xt|Ft−1] = 0, we deduce that
1
2
ft(∆W1, . . . ,∆Wt−1, 1) +
1
2
ft(∆W1, . . . ,∆Wt−1,−1) = 0. (A.4)
Consequently, by (A.3) and (A.4), we have that
1∆Wt=1ξt = 1∆Wt=1ft(∆W1, . . . ,∆Wt) = 1∆Wt=1
ft(∆W1, . . . ,∆Wt)
∆Wt
= 1∆Wt=1
∆Xt
∆Wt
,
1∆Wt=−1ξt = −1∆Wt=−1ft(∆W1, . . . ,∆Wt) = 1∆Wt=−1
ft(∆W1, . . . ,∆Wt)
∆Wt
= 1∆Wt=−1
∆Xt
∆Wt
.
Thus, we conclude that
ξt = 1∆Wt=1
∆Xt
∆Wt
+ 1∆Wt=−1
∆Xt
∆Wt
=
∆Xt
∆Wt
.
From here, and in view of (A.1), we get that
∆Xt = ∆Xt +∆Mt,
and thus ∆Mt = 0, which completes the proof.
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Proposition A.2. Assume that the functions f1, f2 : R→ R are convex, and Lipschitz continuous
on R, with Lipschitz constants c1, c2 respectively. Also suppose that f1(x) ≤ f2(x), x ∈ R. Then,
c1 ≤ c2.
Proof. Denote by ∂+f(x) and ∂−f(x) the right and left derivative, respectively, of the function
f : R → R. Note that, since fi(x) is a convex function, then ∂+fi(x), ∂−fi(x), x ∈ R, exist.
Moreover, ∂+fi(x) is increasing, ∂−fi(x) is decreasing, and ∂+fi(x) ≥ ∂−fi(x), i = 1, 2.
We claim that ∂+fi ≤ ci, i = 1, 2. Otherwise, there exists x
0
i , such that ∂+fi(x) > ci, for all
x ≥ x0i . Therefore, for any x
′
i > x
′′
i > x
0
i , we get that
|fi(x
′
i)− fi(x
′′
i )|
|x′i − x
′′
i |
=
fi(x
′
i)− fi(x
′′
i )
x′i − x
′′
i
> ci,
which contradicts to the assumption that ci is the Lipschitz constant. Hence, ∂+fi(x) ≤ ci, which
implies that limx→∞ ∂+fi(x) exists, and
lim
x→∞
∂+fi(x) ≤ ci, i = 1, 2. (A.5)
Similarly, one can prove that
lim
x→−∞
∂−fi(x) ≥ −ci, i = 1, 2. (A.6)
By (A.5), (A.6) and the fact that ∂+fi(x) ≥ ∂−fi(x), x ∈ R, we have that
max
{∣∣∣ lim
x→−∞
∂−fi(x)
∣∣∣, ∣∣∣ lim
x→∞
∂+fi(x)
∣∣∣} ≤ ci, i = 1, 2. (A.7)
By convexity of fi, we have that
∂−fi(x
1) ≤ ∂+fi(x
1) ≤
fi(x
1)− fi(x
2)
x1 − x2
≤ ∂−fi(x
2) ≤ ∂+fi(x
2),
which implies that
max
{∣∣∣ lim
x→−∞
∂−fi(x)
∣∣∣, ∣∣∣ lim
x→∞
∂+fi(x)
∣∣∣} ≥ |fi(x1)− fi(x2)|
|x1 − x2|
, −∞ < x1 < x2 <∞. (A.8)
Then, in view of (A.7), and the fact that ci is the (smallest) Lipschitz constant, we conclude that
max
{∣∣∣ lim
x→−∞
∂−fi(x)
∣∣∣, ∣∣∣ lim
x→∞
∂+fi(x)
∣∣∣} = ci, i = 1, 2.
To complete the proof, in view of (A.9) and (A.10), it is enough to show that
lim
x→∞
∂+f1(x) ≤ lim
x→∞
∂+f2(x), (A.9)
lim
x→−∞
∂−f1(x) ≥ lim
x→−∞
∂−f2(x). (A.10)
If limx→∞ ∂+f1(x) > limx→∞ ∂+f2(x). Then, there exists x
∗ ∈ R and δ > 0, such that ∂+f1(x) >
∂+f2(x) + δ for any x ≥ x
∗. Let us consider F (x) = f1(x)− f2(x). Then,
∂+F (x) = ∂+f1(x)− ∂+f2(x) > δ > 0, x > x
∗.
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Hence, for any x ∈ R, such that x− x∗ > −F (x
∗)
δ ≥ 0, we get that
F (x) > F (x∗) + δ(x− x∗) > F (x∗)− F (x∗) = 0,
which contradicts the original assumption that f1 ≤ f2. Therefore, c1 ≤ c2, and the proof is
complete.
Proposition A.3. Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space, and let Z be an F-measurable random
variable. Assume that the function g : Ω × R → R is such that, for every z ∈ R, the mapping
ω 7→ g(ω, z) is F-measurable, and the mapping z 7→ g(ω, z) is continuous P-a.s. Then, g( · , Z( · ))
is F-measurable.
Proof. Since Z is F-measurable, then there exists a sequence of simple F-measurable random
variables (µn)∞n=1, such that limn→∞ µ
n = Z with probability one, and µn =
∑mn
i=1 1A
n
i
µni , where
µni ∈ R, A
n
i ∈ F , ∪
mn
i=1A
n
i = Ω, A
n
i ∩A
n
j = ∅, i 6= j. Then, we have that
g(ω, µn(ω)) =
mn∑
i=1
1Ani
(ω)g(ω, µni ), n ∈ Z
+.
Then, the measurability of ω 7→ g(ω, z) implies that g(ω, µni (ω)) is F-measurable, and hence,
g(ω, µn(ω)) is F-measurable for any n ∈ Z+. Moreover, since g(ω, z) is continuous in z, we have
that limn→∞ g(ω, µ
n(ω)) = g(ω,Z(ω)) almost surely, and therefore g( · , Z( · )) is F-measurable.
Proposition A.4. Assume that the underlying market satisfies conditions (M1)-(M6). Then, for
any trading strategy φ, ψ ∈ S(t), there exists θ ∈ S(t) such that
Vu(θ) ≥ λVu(φ) + (1− λ)Vu(ψ), λ ∈ L
∞(Ft), 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, u = t+ 1, . . . , T. (A.11)
Proof. We define the trading strategy θ as follows:
θl/s,iu =
{
0 u = 0, . . . , t,
λφ
l/s,i
u + (1− λ)ψ
l/s,i
u u = t+ 1, . . . , T,
for i = 1, . . . ,K, and
θ0u =
{
0 u = 0, . . . , t,
θ0t+1 +
∑u
r=t+2 ζr, u = t+ 1, . . . , T,
where
θ0t+1 =−
K∑
i=1
(
P askt (θ
l,i
t+1,D
ask,i)− P bidt (θ
s,i
t+1,D
bid,i)
)
, (A.12)
ζu =
K∑
i=1
(θl,iu−1D
ask,i
u−1 − θ
s,i
u−1D
bid,i
u−1 )−
K∑
i=1
(
1
∆θl,iu ≥0
P asku−1(∆θ
l,i
u ,D
ask,i)− 1
∆θl,iu <0
P bidu−1(−∆θ
l,i
u ,D
ask,i)
− 1
∆θs,iu ≥0
P bidu−1(∆θ
s,i
u ,D
bid,i) + 1
∆θs,iu <0
P asku−1(−∆θ
s,i
u ,D
bid,i)
)
, u = t+ 2, . . . , T.
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By straightforward bookkeeping one can show that θ is a self-financing trading strategy, namely
it satisfies (4.2). Also, due to the construction of θ, clearly, it belongs to S(t).
Clearly (4.2) is fulfilled for u = 0, . . . , t. For u = t+ 1, we get that
∆θ0t+1 = θ
0
t+1,
∆θ
l/s,i
t+1 = θ
l/s,i
t+1 , i = 1, . . . ,K.
Then, it implies that
∆θ0t+1 +
K∑
i=1
(
1
∆θl,it+1≥0
P askt (∆θ
l,i
t+1,D
ask,i)− 1
∆θl,it+1<0
P bidt (−∆θ
l,i
t+1,D
ask,i)
−1
∆θs,it+1≥0
P bidt (∆θ
s,i
t+1,D
bid,i) + 1
∆θs,it+1<0
P askt (−∆θ
s,i
t+1,D
bid,i)
)
=−
K∑
i=1
(
P askt (θ
l,i
t+1,D
ask,i)− P bidt (θ
s,i
t+1,D
bid,i)
)
+
K∑
i=1
(
P askt (θ
l,i
t+1,D
ask,i)− P bidt (θ
s,i
t+1,D
bid,i)
)
=0 =
K∑
i=1
(θl,it D
ask,i
t − θ
s,i
t D
bid,i
t ).
For u = t+ 2, . . . , T , we have that ∆θu = ζu. Therefore,
∆θ0u +
K∑
i=1
(
1
∆θl,iu ≥0
P asku−1(,∆θ
l,i
u ,D
ask,i)− 1
∆θl,iu <0
P bidu−1(−∆θ
l,i
u ,D
ask,i)
−1
∆θs,iu ≥0
P bidu−1(∆θ
s,i
u ,D
bid,i) + 1
∆θs,iu <0
P asku−1(−∆θ
s,i
u ,D
bid,i)
)
=
K∑
i=1
(θl,iu−1D
ask,i
u−1 − θ
s,i
u−1D
bid,i
u−1 ), u = t+ 2, . . . , T
Thus, θ is a self-financing trading strategy.
We are left to prove (A.11). Since θ
l/s,i
u = λφ
l/s,i
u + (1 − λ)ψ
l/s,i
u , u = t+ 1, . . . , T , and in view
of (M5), it is sufficient to verify that
θ0u ≥ λφ
0
u + (1− λ)ψ
0
u, u = t+ 1, . . . , T, (A.13)
or equivalently,
θ0t+1 ≥ λφ
0
t+1 + (1− λ)ψ
0
t+1, (A.14)
∆θ0u ≥ λ∆φ
0
u + (1− λ)∆ψ
0
u, u = t+ 2, . . . , T. (A.15)
Since φ,ψ ∈ S(t), then
φ0t+1 =−
K∑
i=1
(
P askt (φ
l,i
t+1,D
ask,i)− P bidt (φ
s,i
t+1,D
bid,i)
)
,
ψ0t+1 =−
K∑
i=1
(
P askt (ψ
l,i
t+1,D
ask,i)− P bidt (ψ
s,i
t+1,D
bid,i)
)
.
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From here, combine the above with (A.12), also take into account of (M5). Then, (A.14) is an
immediate result.
Next, we will prove (A.15). Fix u = t+ 2, . . . , T . Due to the above construction, ∆θ0u satisfies
the following identity
∆θ0u = ζu =
K∑
i=1
(θl,iu−1D
ask,i
u−1 − θ
s,i
u−1D
bid,i
u−1 )
−
K∑
i=1
(
1
∆θl,iu ≥0
P asku−1(∆θ
l,i
u ,D
ask,i)− 1
∆θl,iu <0
P bidu−1(−∆θ
l,i
u ,D
ask,i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Il(θ,i)
−1
∆θs,iu ≥0
P bidu−1(∆θ
s,i
u ,D
bid,i) + 1
∆θs,iu <0
P asku−1(−∆θ
s,i
u ,D
bid,i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Is(θ,i)
)
.
According to the self-financing condition (4.2), we get that
∆φ0u =
K∑
i=1
(φl,iu−1D
ask,i
u−1 − φ
s,i
u−1D
bid,i
u−1 )−
K∑
i=1
(I l(φ, i) + Is(φ, i)),
∆ψ0u =
K∑
i=1
(ψl,iu−1D
ask,i
u−1 − ψ
s,i
u−1D
bid,i
u−1 )−
K∑
i=1
(I l(ψ, i) + Is(ψ, i)).
Thus (A.15) is equivalent to
K∑
i=1
(I(θ, l, i) + I(θ, s, i)) ≤ λ
K∑
i=1
(I(φ, l, i) + I(φ, s, i)) + (1− λ)
K∑
i=1
(I(ψ, l, i) + I(ψ, s, i)),
which will follow once we show that
I l(θ, i) ≤ λI l(φ, i) + (1− λ)I l(ψ, i), (A.16)
and
Is(θ, i) ≤ λIs(φ, i) + (1 − λ)Is(ψ, i). (A.17)
We will prove (A.16), and (A.17) follows similarly. Due to the symmetry in φ and ψ, then without
loss of generality, we assume that 12 ≤ λ ≤ 1.
For the purpose of showing (A.16), we define the following sets
Ai,0t = {∆φ
l,i
t ≥ 0,∆ψ
l,i
t ≥ 0},
Ai,1t =
{
∆φl,it ≥ 0,∆ψ
l,i
t < 0,∆φ
l,i
t ≥
λ− 1
λ
∆ψl,it
}
,
Ai,2t =
{
∆φl,it ≥ 0,∆ψ
l,i
t < 0,∆φ
l,i
t <
λ− 1
λ
∆ψl,it
}
,
Ai,3t =
{
∆φl,it < 0,∆ψ
l,i
t ≥ 0,∆φ
l,i
t ≥
λ− 1
λ
∆ψl,it
}
,
Ai,4t =
{
∆φl,it < 0,∆ψ
l,i
t ≥ 0,∆φ
l,i
t <
λ− 1
λ
∆ψl,it
}
,
Ai,5t = {∆φ
l,i
t < 0,∆ψ
l,i
t < 0},
61
for any t ∈ T . Clearly, we have that Ai,0t ∪A
i,1
t ∪A
i,2
t = {∆φ
l,i
t ≥ 0}, A
i,0
t ∪A
i,3
t ∪A
i,4
t = {∆ψ
l,i
t ≥ 0},
Ai,1t ∪A
i,2
t ∪A
i,5
t = {∆ψ
l,i
t < 0}, and A
i,3
t ∪A
i,4
t ∪A
i,5
t = {∆φ
l,i
t < 0}. Hence, (A.16) can be represented
as
λ
(
(1
Ai,0u
+ 1
Ai,1u
+ 1
Ai,2u
)P asku−1(∆φ
l,i
u ,D
ask,i)− (1
Ai,3u
+ 1
Ai,4u
+ 1
Ai,5u
)P bidu−1(−∆φ
l,i
u ,D
bid,i)
)
+ (1− λ)
(
(1
Ai,0u
+ 1
Ai,3u
+ 1
Ai,4u
)P asku−1(∆ψ
l,i
u ,D
ask,i)− (1
Ai,1u
+ 1
Ai,2u
+ 1
Ai,5u
)P bidu−1(−∆ψ
l,i
u ,D
bid,i)
)
.
In view of (M5), we get that
1
Ai,0u
(
λP asku−1(∆φ
l,i
u ,D
ask,i) + (1− λ)P asku−1(ψ
l,i
u ,D
ask,i)
)
≥ 1
Ai,0u
P asku−1(∆θ
l,i
u ,D
ask,i), (A.18)
and
1
Ai,5u
(
− λP bid,iu−1 (∆φ
l,i
u ,D
ask,i)− (1− λ)P bid,iu−1 (−∆ψ
l,i
u ,D
ask,i)
)
≥ −1
Ai,5u
P bidu−1(−∆θ
l,i
u ,D
ask,i).
(A.19)
According to (M6), we have that
1
Ai,1u
(
λP asku−1(∆φ
l,i
u ,D
ask,i)− (1− λ)P bidu−1(−∆ψ
l,i
u ,D
ask,i)
)
≥ 1
Ai,1u
P asku−1(∆θ
l,i
u ,D
ask,i), (A.20)
1
Ai,2u
(
λP ask,iu−1 (∆φ
l,i
u ,D
ask,i)− (1− λ)P bid,iu−1 (−∆ψ
l,i
u ,D
ask,i)
)
≥ −1
Ai,2u
P bidu−1(∆θ
l,i
u ,D
ask,i), (A.21)
1
Ai,3u
(
− λP bid,iu−1 (−∆φ
l,i
u ,D
ask,i) + (1− λ)P ask,iu−1 (∆ψ
l,i
u ,D
ask,i)
)
≥ 1
Ai,3u
P asku−1(∆θ
l,i
u ,D
ask,i), (A.22)
1
Ai,4u
(
− λP bid,iu−1 (−φ
l,i
u ,D
ask,i) + (1− λ)P ask,iu−1 (∆ψ
l,i
u ,D
ask,i)
)
≥ −1
Ai,4u
P bidu−1(∆θ
l,i
u ,D
ask,i). (A.23)
Summing up inequalities (A.18)-(A.23) part by part, we deduce that (A.16) is true, which concludes
the proof.
Proposition A.5. Let φ ∈ S(t), and let L+(t) be defined as
L+(t) :=
{
(Zs)
T
s=0 : Zs ∈ L
2
+(Ω,Fs,P), Zs = 0, s ≤ t
}
,
for t = 0, . . . , T − 1. Then, for any t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}, the set
H(t) :=
{(
0, . . . , 0,∆(Vt+1(φ)− Zt+1), . . . ,∆(VT (φ)− ZT )
)
: φ ∈ S(t), Z ∈ L+(t)
}
is a convex set.
Proof. Let H1, H2 ∈ H(t), and let λ ∈ L∞(Ft) such that 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. Then, there exists φ, ψ ∈ S(t),
Z1, Z2 ∈ L+(t), such that
H1 =
(
0, . . . , 0,∆(Vt+1(φ)− Z
1
t+1), . . . ,∆(VT (φ)− Z
1
T )
)
,
and
H2 =
(
0, . . . , 0,∆(Vt+1(ψ)− Z
2
t+1), . . . ,∆(VT (ψ)− Z
2
T )
)
.
62
According to Proposition A.4, there exists θ ∈ S(t), such that λVs(φ) + (1 − λ)Vs(ψ) ≤ Vs(θ) for
any s = t+ 1, . . . , T . Therefore,
λ
s∑
u=t+1
H1u + (1− λ)
s∑
u=t+1
H2u = λVs(φ) + (1− λ)Vs(ψ)− λZ
1
s − (1− λ)Z
2
s
≤ Vs(θ)− (λZ
1
s + (1− λ)Z
2
s ) ≤ Vs(θ),
for any s = t + 1, . . . , T . By Definition 5.1, we have that λH1 + (1 − λ)H2 ∈ H(t). The proof is
complete.
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